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    SubjectRe: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 1/2] security, perf: allow further restriction of perf_event_open
    Em Wed, Oct 19, 2016 at 12:01:26PM +0200, Peter Zijlstra escreveu:
    > On Tue, Oct 18, 2016 at 05:15:01PM -0400, Daniel Micay wrote:
    > > It's also worth noting that fine-grained control via a scoped mechanism
    > > would likely only be used to implement *more restrictions* on Android,
    > > not to make the feature less aggressive.

    > > It's desirable for perf events to be disabled by default for non-root
    > > across the board on Android.

    > Right, but this is Android. The knob seems to now also live in Debian
    > (and derived) distros. And there it is utter crap.

    > It completely defeats having perf for a fairly large segment of
    > corporate developers who do not get to have root on their own machines
    > (which is stupid policy but whatever).

    > It similarly defeats development of self profiling JITs and whatnot.

    > A capability would allow people to run perf (or another sanctioned
    > binary), even though in general they cannot do sys_perf_event_open().

    But self profiling JITs would be useful for non-developers, on Android
    (anywhere, really), and for that it would require being able to at
    least, well, self profile, using sys_perf_event_open() by a normal
    process, limited to profiling itself, no?

    This not being possible, self profiling will use some other means, its
    like sys_perf_event_open() never existed for them.

    - Arnaldo

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