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SubjectRe: [PATCH] cgroup: Add new capability to allow a process to migrate other tasks between cgroups
On Mon, Oct 17, 2016 at 3:40 PM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> wrote:
> On Mon, Oct 17, 2016 at 3:35 PM, John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org> wrote:
>> This patch adds CAP_GROUP_MIGRATE and logic to allows a process
>> to migrate other tasks between cgroups.
>>
>> In Android (where this feature originated), the ActivityManager tracks
>> various application states (TOP_APP, FOREGROUND, BACKGROUND, SYSTEM,
>> etc), and then as applications change states, the SchedPolicy logic
>> will migrate the application tasks between different cgroups used
>> to control the different application states (for example, there is a
>> background cpuset cgroup which can limit background tasks to stay
>> on one low-power cpu, and the bg_non_interactive cpuctrl cgroup can
>> then further limit those background tasks to a small percentage of
>> that one cpu's cpu time).
>>
>> However, for security reasons, Android doesn't want to make the
>> system_server (the process that runs the ActivityManager and
>> SchedPolicy logic), run as root. So in the Android common.git
>> kernel, they have some logic to allow cgroups to loosen their
>> permissions so CAP_SYS_NICE tasks can migrate other tasks between
>> cgroups.
>>
>> The approach taken there overloads CAP_SYS_NICE a bit much, and
>> is maybe more complicated then needed.
>>
>> So this patch, as suggested by Tejun, simply adds a new process
>> capability flag (CAP_CGROUP_MIGRATE), and uses it when checking
>> if a task can migrate other tasks between cgroups.
>>
>> I've tested this with AOSP master (though its a bit hacked in as I
>> still need to properly get the selinux bits aware of the new
>> capability bit) with selinux set to permissive and it seems to be
>> working well.
>>
>> Thoughts and feedback would be appreciated!
>>
>> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
>> Cc: Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com>
>> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
>> Cc: cgroups@vger.kernel.org
>> Cc: Android Kernel Team <kernel-team@android.com>
>> Cc: Rom Lemarchand <romlem@android.com>
>> Cc: Colin Cross <ccross@android.com>
>> Cc: Dmitry Shmidt <dimitrysh@google.com>
>> Cc: Ricky Zhou <rickyz@chromium.org>
>> Cc: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
>> Cc: Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com>
>> Cc: Christian Poetzsch <christian.potzsch@imgtec.com>
>> Cc: Amit Pundir <amit.pundir@linaro.org>
>> Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
>> Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
>> Signed-off-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
>> ---
>> v2: Renamed to just CAP_CGROUP_MIGRATE as reccomended by Tejun
>> ---
>> include/uapi/linux/capability.h | 5 ++++-
>> kernel/cgroup.c | 3 ++-
>> 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/capability.h b/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
>> index 49bc062..44d7ff4 100644
>> --- a/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
>> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
>> @@ -349,8 +349,11 @@ struct vfs_cap_data {
>>
>> #define CAP_AUDIT_READ 37
>>
>> +/* Allow migrating tasks between cgroups */
>>
>> -#define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_AUDIT_READ
>> +#define CAP_CGROUP_MIGRATE 38
>> +
>> +#define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_CGROUP_MIGRATE
>>
>> #define cap_valid(x) ((x) >= 0 && (x) <= CAP_LAST_CAP)
>>
>> diff --git a/kernel/cgroup.c b/kernel/cgroup.c
>> index 85bc9be..09f84d2 100644
>> --- a/kernel/cgroup.c
>> +++ b/kernel/cgroup.c
>> @@ -2856,7 +2856,8 @@ static int cgroup_procs_write_permission(struct task_struct *task,
>> */
>> if (!uid_eq(cred->euid, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID) &&
>> !uid_eq(cred->euid, tcred->uid) &&
>> - !uid_eq(cred->euid, tcred->suid))
>> + !uid_eq(cred->euid, tcred->suid) &&
>> + !ns_capable(tcred->user_ns, CAP_CGROUP_MIGRATE))
>> ret = -EACCES;
>
> This logic seems rather confused to me. Without this patch, a user
> can write to procs if it's root *or* it matches the target uid *or* it
> matches the target suid. How does this make sense? How about
> ptrace_may_access(...) || ns_capable(tcred->user_ns,
> CAP_CGROUP_MIGRATE)?

Though ptrace_may_access would open it also to apps with
CAP_SYS_PTRACE as well, no?

Would pulling out from __ptrace_may_access the:
if (uid_eq(caller_uid, tcred->euid) &&
uid_eq(caller_uid, tcred->suid) &&
uid_eq(caller_uid, tcred->uid) &&
gid_eq(caller_gid, tcred->egid) &&
gid_eq(caller_gid, tcred->sgid) &&
gid_eq(caller_gid, tcred->gid))
goto ok;

check and creating a new helper that could be shared between them be
the right approach?

thanks
-john

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