Messages in this thread Patch in this message | | | From | Kamal Mostafa <> | Subject | [PATCH 4.2.y-ckt 021/211] KEYS: Don't permit request_key() to construct a new keyring | Date | Tue, 5 Jan 2016 11:42:09 -0800 |
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4.2.8-ckt1 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
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From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
commit 911b79cde95c7da0ec02f48105358a36636b7a71 upstream.
If request_key() is used to find a keyring, only do the search part - don't do the construction part if the keyring was not found by the search. We don't really want keyrings in the negative instantiated state since the rejected/negative instantiation error value in the payload is unioned with keyring metadata.
Now the kernel gives an error:
request_key("keyring", "#selinux,bdekeyring", "keyring", KEY_SPEC_USER_SESSION_KEYRING) = -1 EPERM (Operation not permitted)
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com> --- security/keys/request_key.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/security/keys/request_key.c b/security/keys/request_key.c index 486ef6f..0d62531 100644 --- a/security/keys/request_key.c +++ b/security/keys/request_key.c @@ -440,6 +440,9 @@ static struct key *construct_key_and_link(struct keyring_search_context *ctx, kenter(""); + if (ctx->index_key.type == &key_type_keyring) + return ERR_PTR(-EPERM); + user = key_user_lookup(current_fsuid()); if (!user) return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); -- 1.9.1
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