Messages in this thread | | | From | Dmitry Vyukov <> | Date | Tue, 19 Jan 2016 15:06:10 +0100 | Subject | Re: [PATCH v5] kernel: add kcov code coverage |
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On Tue, Jan 19, 2016 at 1:42 PM, Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> wrote: > kcov provides code coverage collection for coverage-guided fuzzing > (randomized testing). Coverage-guided fuzzing is a testing technique > that uses coverage feedback to determine new interesting inputs to a > system. A notable user-space example is AFL > (http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/). However, this technique is not > widely used for kernel testing due to missing compiler and kernel > support. > > kcov does not aim to collect as much coverage as possible. It aims > to collect more or less stable coverage that is function of syscall > inputs. To achieve this goal it does not collect coverage in > soft/hard interrupts and instrumentation of some inherently > non-deterministic or non-interesting parts of kernel is disbled > (e.g. scheduler, locking). > > Currently there is a single coverage collection mode (tracing), > but the API anticipates additional collection modes. > Initially I also implemented a second mode which exposes > coverage in a fixed-size hash table of counters (what Quentin > used in his original patch). I've dropped the second mode for > simplicity. > > This patch adds the necessary support on kernel side. > The complimentary compiler support was added in gcc revision 231296. > > We've used this support to build syzkaller system call fuzzer, > which has found 90 kernel bugs in just 2 months: > https://github.com/google/syzkaller/wiki/Found-Bugs > We've also found 30+ bugs in our internal systems with syzkaller. > Another (yet unexplored) direction where kcov coverage would greatly > help is more traditional "blob mutation". For example, mounting > a random blob as a filesystem, or receiving a random blob over wire. > > Why not gcov. Typical fuzzing loop looks as follows: (1) reset > coverage, (2) execute a bit of code, (3) collect coverage, repeat. > A typical coverage can be just a dozen of basic blocks (e.g. an > invalid input). In such context gcov becomes prohibitively expensive > as reset/collect coverage steps depend on total number of basic > blocks/edges in program (in case of kernel it is about 2M). Cost of > kcov depends only on number of executed basic blocks/edges. On top of > that, kernel requires per-thread coverage because there are > always background threads and unrelated processes that also produce > coverage. With inlined gcov instrumentation per-thread coverage is not > possible. > > kcov exposes kernel PCs and control flow to user-space which > is insecure. But debugfs should not be mapped as user accessible. > > Based on a patch by Quentin Casasnovas. > Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> > Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> > --- > Anticipating reasonable questions regarding usage of this feature. > Quentin Casasnovas and Vegard Nossum also plan to use kcov for > coverage-guided fuzzing. Currently they use a custom kernel patch > for their fuzzer and found several dozens of bugs. > There is also interest from Intel 0-DAY kernel test infrastructure. > > Based on commit a200dcb34693084e56496960d855afdeaaf9578f. > > v2: - added note to commit desciption that kcov is insecure, > but debugfs should not be mapped as user accessible. > - make CONFIG_KCOV depend on CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_KCOV > instead of conditional inclusion with if/endif > (as per Kees comments). > > v3: - disabled instrumentation of lib/hweight.c > - changed task_struct.kcov_size type to unsigned > - moved kcov.c from kernel/kcov/ to kernel/ > - fixed multi-line comment formatting > - changed BUG_ONs to WARN_ONs > - added kcov_get() helper > > v4: - pre-populate mapping with pages in kcov_mmap() > - don't get kcov references on vma open/copy, > vma holds a reference to the file which is enough > - extend KCOV_INIT_TRACE to support both compressed > 4-byte PCs and full 8-byte PCs (it now accepts a struct) > - update example in Documentation/kcov.txt > > v5: - export only unsigned long PCs (no compression to 4 bytes) > - remove KCOV dependency on !RANDOMIZE_BASE
I've made some measurements. Currently I have ~30MB of coverage data. Let's say it will grow 2x over time, that's 60MB. I also use a GC language so it actually consumes 2x = 120MB. If PCs are doubled, that's 240MB. I think I can live with this. Or I can somehow compress PCs to 4 bytes in user-space. So changed kcov to expose only unsigned-long-sized PCs as is. This makes the interface much cleaner. And also removes all potential issues wrt other archs and KASLR (user-space can canonicalize PCs using /proc/modules and kaslr base for text).
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