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SubjectRe: [PATCH] arm/xen: Enable user access to the kernel before issuing a privcmd call
On 11/09/15 15:55, Ian Campbell wrote:
> On Fri, 2015-09-11 at 15:45 +0100, Julien Grall wrote:
>> On 11/09/15 15:29, Ian Campbell wrote:
>>> On Fri, 2015-09-11 at 15:16 +0100, Julien Grall wrote:
>>>> When Xen is copyin data to/from the guest it will check if the kernel
>>>
>>> "copying"
>>>
>>>> has the right to do the access. If not, the hypercall will return an
>>>> error.
>>>>
>>>> After the commit a5e090acbf545c0a3b04080f8a488b17ec41fe02 "ARM:
>>>> software-based priviledged-no-access support", the kernel can't
>>>> access
>>>
>>> "privileged"
>>>
>>>> anymore the user space by default. This will result to fail on every
>>>
>>> "any more" (or "any longer")
>>>
>>>> hypercall made by the userspace (i.e via privcmd).
>>>>
>>>> We have to enable the userspace access and then restore the correct
>>>> permission everytime the privmcd is used to made an hypercall.
>>>
>>> "every time" and "privcmd"
>>>
>>>> HYPERCALL1(tmem_op);
>>>> HYPERCALL2(multicall);
>>>>
>>>> -ENTRY(privcmd_call)
>>>> +ENTRY(__privcmd_call)
>>>
>>> arch/arm/include/asm/assembler.h seems to contain uaccess_* macros
>>> which
>>> could be used right here directly I think? That would be preferable to
>>> wrapping I think.
>>
>> Looking to the uaccess_save macro:
>
> I was thinking more about uaccess_enable/disable.

Well, we can't assume that the function will be called with uaccess
disabled. So we have to save the state and restore it after issuing the
hypercall.

Regards,

--
Julien Grall


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