Messages in this thread | | | Date | Mon, 31 Aug 2015 18:22:38 +0200 | Subject | Re: kdbus_proc_permission (Re: [GIT PULL] kdbus updates for Greg) | From | David Herrmann <> |
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Hi
On Mon, Aug 31, 2015 at 5:37 PM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> wrote: > On Mon, Aug 24, 2015 at 2:52 AM, David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com> wrote: >> On Mon, Aug 10, 2015 at 4:42 AM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> wrote: >>> I haven't checked the context in which it's used, but in order for >>> kdbus_proc_permission to do what it claims to do, it appears to be >>> missing calls to security_inode_permission and >>> security_file_permission. >> >> Both are expected to be added by lsm patches (both hooks you mentioned >> are empty if no lsm is selected). > > Will that mean that existing MAC policies stop being fully enforced > (in effect) if kdbus is installed?
It means kdbus messages carry information about the sender, which LSMs might prevent you to read via /proc. Just like you can send dbus messages to a peer, which LSM-enhanced dbus-daemon might not allow. If you use LSMs, we clearly advise you to wait for kdbus to gain LSM support. We explicitly support legacy dbus1-compat for exactly such reasons.
Thanks David
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