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SubjectRe: [PATCH 2/2] perf/x86/intel/bts: Disallow use by unprivileged users on paranoid systems
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Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> writes:

> * Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> wrote:
>
>> BTS leaks kernel addresses even in userspace-only mode due to imprecise IP
>> sampling, so sometimes syscall entry points or page fault handler addresses
>> end up in a userspace trace.
>>
>> Now, intel_bts driver exports trace data zero-copy, it does not scan through
>> it to filter out the kernel addresses and it's would be a O(n) job.
>>
>> To work around this situation, this patch forbids the use of intel_bts
>> driver by unprivileged users with paranoid setting higher than 1, which
>> forbids kernel tracing.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
>> ---
>> arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_bts.c | 10 ++++++++++
>> 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_bts.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_bts.c
>> index 80df16e020..4f6daff92d 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_bts.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_bts.c
>> @@ -495,6 +495,16 @@ static int bts_event_init(struct perf_event *event)
>> if (x86_add_exclusive(x86_lbr_exclusive_bts))
>> return -EBUSY;
>>
>> + /*
>> + * BTS leaks kernel addresses even when CPL0 tracing is
>> + * disabled, so disallow intel_bts driver for unprivileged
>> + * users on paranoid systems since it provides trace data
>> + * to the user in a zero-copy fashion.
>> + */
>> + if (event->attr.exclude_kernel && perf_paranoid_kernel() &&
>> + !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
>> + return -EACCES;
>
> I.e. it's disabled by default as well, with default paranoia settings?

Actually no, the kernel's default is 1, which allows kernel profiling
for unprivileged users. Distros might be more strict though.

Regards,
--
Alex


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