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SubjectRe: [PATCH v7] procfs: Always expose /proc/<pid>/map_files/ and make it readable
On Wednesday 07/15 at 15:21 -0700, Andrew Morton wrote:
> On Thu, 18 Jun 2015 19:32:18 -0700 Calvin Owens <calvinowens@fb.com> wrote:
>
> > Currently, /proc/<pid>/map_files/ is restricted to CAP_SYS_ADMIN, and
> > is only exposed if CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE is set.
> >
> > Each mapped file region gets a symlink in /proc/<pid>/map_files/
> > corresponding to the virtual address range at which it is mapped. The
> > symlinks work like the symlinks in /proc/<pid>/fd/, so you can follow
> > them to the backing file even if that backing file has been unlinked.
> >
> > Currently, files which are mapped, unlinked, and closed are impossible
> > to stat() from userspace. Exposing /proc/<pid>/map_files/ closes this
> > functionality "hole".
> >
> > Not being able to stat() such files makes noticing and explicitly
> > accounting for the space they use on the filesystem impossible. You can
> > work around this by summing up the space used by every file in the
> > filesystem and subtracting that total from what statfs() tells you, but
> > that obviously isn't great, and it becomes unworkable once your
> > filesystem becomes large enough.
> >
> > This patch moves map_files/ out from behind CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE,
> > and adjusts the permissions enforced on it as follows:
>
> proc_pid_follow_link() got changed while you weren't looking, causing
>
> fs/proc/base.c: In function 'proc_map_files_follow_link':
> fs/proc/base.c:1963: warning: passing argument 2 of 'proc_pid_follow_link' from incompatible pointer type
> fs/proc/base.c:1578: note: expected 'void **' but argument is of type 'struct nameidata *'
> fs/proc/base.c:1963: warning: return discards qualifiers from pointer target type
> fs/proc/base.c: At top level:
> fs/proc/base.c:1971: warning: initialization from incompatible pointer type
>
> I just changed it to pass NULL:

Thanks for cleaning this up, I'll make sure to check outstanding patches
against new -rcs and -nexts in the future.

Thanks,
Calvin

> --- a/fs/proc/base.c~procfs-always-expose-proc-pid-map_files-and-make-it-readable-fix
> +++ a/fs/proc/base.c
> @@ -1955,12 +1955,13 @@ struct map_files_info {
> * symlinks may be used to bypass permissions on ancestor directories in the
> * path to the file in question.
> */
> -static void *proc_map_files_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nd)
> +static void *
> +proc_map_files_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nd)
> {
> if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
>
> - return proc_pid_follow_link(dentry, nd);
> + return proc_pid_follow_link(dentry, NULL);
> }
>
> /*
> _
>


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