[lkml]   [2015]   [May]   [19]   [last100]   RSS Feed
Views: [wrap][no wrap]   [headers]  [forward] 
Messages in this thread
SubjectRe: [PATCH v5] procfs: Always expose /proc/<pid>/map_files/ and make it readable
On Mon, May 18, 2015 at 8:10 PM, Calvin Owens <> wrote:
> Currently, /proc/<pid>/map_files/ is restricted to CAP_SYS_ADMIN, and
> is only exposed if CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE is set. This interface is
> very useful for enumerating the files mapped into a process when the
> more verbose information in /proc/<pid>/maps is not needed. It also
> allows access to file descriptors for files that have been deleted and
> closed but are still mmapped into a process, which can be very useful
> for introspection and debugging.
> This patch moves the folder out from behind CHECKPOINT_RESTORE, and

I'm fine with this.

> removes the CAP_SYS_ADMIN restrictions. With that change alone,
> following the links would have required PTRACE_MODE_READ like the
> links in /proc/<pid>/fd/*.

I'm still not at all convinced that this is safe. Here are a few ways
that it could have unintended consequences:

1. Mmap a dma-buf and then open /proc/self/map_files/addr. You get an
fd pointing at a different inode than you mapped. (kdbus would have
the same problem if it were merged.)

2. Open a file with O_RDONLY, mmap it with PROT_READ, close the file,
then open /proc/self/map_files/addr with O_RDWR. I don't see anything
preventing that from succeeding.

3. Open a file, mmap it, close the fd, chroot, drop privileges, open
/proc/self/map_files/addr, then call ftruncate.

So NAK as-is, I think.

Fixing #1 would involve changing the way mmap works, I think. Fixing
#2 would require similar infrastructure to what we'd need to fix the
existing /proc/pid/fd mode holes. I have no clue how to even approach
fixing #3.

What's the use case of this patch?


 \ /
  Last update: 2015-05-19 20:21    [W:0.092 / U:9.152 seconds]
©2003-2020 Jasper Spaans|hosted at Digital Ocean and TransIP|Read the blog|Advertise on this site