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    SubjectRe: [PATCH V6 05/10] audit: log creation and deletion of namespace instances
    Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> writes:
    > As Eric, and others, have stated, the container concept is a userspace idea,
    > not a kernel idea; the kernel only knows, and cares about, namespaces. This
    > is unlikely to change.
    >
    > However, as Steve points out, there is precedence for the kernel to record
    > userspace tokens for the sake of audit. Personally I'm not a big fan of this
    > in general, but I do recognize that it does satisfy a legitimate need. Think
    > of things like auid and the sessionid as necessary evils; audit is already
    > chock full of evilness I doubt one more will doom us all to hell.
    >
    > Moving forward, I'd like to see the following:

    > * Create a container ID token (unsigned 32-bit integer?), similar to
    > auid/sessionid, that is set by userspace and carried by the kernel to be used
    > in audit records. I'd like to see some discussion on how we manage this, e.g.
    > how do handle container ID inheritance, how do we handle nested containers
    > (setting the containerid when it is already set), do we care if multiple
    > different containers share the same namespace config, etc.?


    > Can we all live with this? If not, please suggest some alternate ideas;
    > simply shouting "IT'S ALL CRAP!" isn't helpful for anyone ... it may be true,
    > but it doesn't help us solve the problem ;)

    Without stopping and defining what someone means by container I think it
    is pretty much nonsense.

    Should every vsftp connection get a container every? Every chrome tab?

    At some of the connections per second numbers I have seen we might
    exhaust a 32bit number in an hour or two. Will any of that make sense
    to someone reading the audit logs?

    Without considerning that container creation is an unprivileged
    operation I think it is pretty much nonsense. Do I get to say I am any
    container I want? That would seem to invalidate the concept of
    userspace setting a container id.

    How does any of this interact with setns? AKA entering a container?

    I will go as far as looking at patches. If someone comes up with
    a mission statement about what they are actually trying to achieve and a
    mechanism that actually achieves that, and that allows for containers to
    nest we can talk about doing something like that.

    But for right now I just hear proposals for things that make no sense
    and can not possibly work. Not least because it will require modifying
    every program that creates a container and who knows how many of them
    there are. Especially since you don't need to be root. Modifying
    /usr/bin/unshare seems a little far out to me.

    Eric






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