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SubjectRe: [PATCH kernel v9 26/32] powerpc/iommu: Add userspace view of TCE table
On 05/11/2015 12:11 PM, Alexey Kardashevskiy wrote:
> On 05/05/2015 10:02 PM, David Gibson wrote:
>> On Fri, May 01, 2015 at 05:12:45PM +1000, Alexey Kardashevskiy wrote:
>>> On 05/01/2015 02:23 PM, David Gibson wrote:
>>>> On Fri, May 01, 2015 at 02:01:17PM +1000, Alexey Kardashevskiy wrote:
>>>>> On 04/29/2015 04:31 PM, David Gibson wrote:
>>>>>> On Sat, Apr 25, 2015 at 10:14:50PM +1000, Alexey Kardashevskiy wrote:
>>>>>>> In order to support memory pre-registration, we need a way to track
>>>>>>> the use of every registered memory region and only allow unregistration
>>>>>>> if a region is not in use anymore. So we need a way to tell from what
>>>>>>> region the just cleared TCE was from.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> This adds a userspace view of the TCE table into iommu_table struct.
>>>>>>> It contains userspace address, one per TCE entry. The table is only
>>>>>>> allocated when the ownership over an IOMMU group is taken which means
>>>>>>> it is only used from outside of the powernv code (such as VFIO).
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Signed-off-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@ozlabs.ru>
>>>>>>> ---
>>>>>>> Changes:
>>>>>>> v9:
>>>>>>> * fixed code flow in error cases added in v8
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> v8:
>>>>>>> * added ENOMEM on failed vzalloc()
>>>>>>> ---
>>>>>>> arch/powerpc/include/asm/iommu.h | 6 ++++++
>>>>>>> arch/powerpc/kernel/iommu.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
>>>>>>> arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/pci-ioda.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++--
>>>>>>> 3 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/iommu.h
>>>>>>> b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/iommu.h
>>>>>>> index 7694546..1472de3 100644
>>>>>>> --- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/iommu.h
>>>>>>> +++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/iommu.h
>>>>>>> @@ -111,9 +111,15 @@ struct iommu_table {
>>>>>>> unsigned long *it_map; /* A simple allocation bitmap for
>>>>>>> now */
>>>>>>> unsigned long it_page_shift;/* table iommu page size */
>>>>>>> struct iommu_table_group *it_table_group;
>>>>>>> + unsigned long *it_userspace; /* userspace view of the table */
>>>>>>
>>>>>> A single unsigned long doesn't seem like enough.
>>>>>
>>>>> Why single? This is an array.
>>>>
>>>> As in single per page.
>>>
>>>
>>> Sorry, I am not following you here.
>>> It is per IOMMU page. MAP/UNMAP work with IOMMU pages which are fully
>>> backed
>>> with either system page or a huge page.
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>>>> How do you know
>>>>>> which process's address space this address refers to?
>>>>>
>>>>> It is a current task. Multiple userspaces cannot use the same
>>>>> container/tables.
>>>>
>>>> Where is that enforced?
>>>
>>>
>>> It is accessed from VFIO DMA map/unmap which are ioctls() to a container's
>>> fd which is per a process.
>>
>> Usually, but what enforces that. If you open a container fd, then
>> fork(), and attempt to map from both parent and child, what happens?
>
>
> vfio_group_fops::open() checks if the group is already opened, and I want
> to believe open() is called from fork() for new fd so no mapping can happen
> later.

I am wrong here. Nothing prevents multiple userspace from using the same
container. It still does not seem really dangerous as in order to use VFIO,
someone with the root privilege should set right permissions on /dev/vfio*
first anyway and that person knows what QEMU does and what QEMU does not :)

I could add pid into iommu_table, next to it_userspace, and fail when other
pid is trying to change the it_userspace table. Not sure if I want to do
this check in realmode though (performance). Or make sure somehow that
fork() closes container and group fd's (but how?). In the worst case, wrong
userspace page will be put and there will be random backtraces on the host
kernel. What would you do?


--
Alexey


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