lkml.org 
[lkml]   [2015]   [Apr]   [29]   [last100]   RSS Feed
Views: [wrap][no wrap]   [headers]  [forward] 
 
Messages in this thread
/
Date
From
SubjectRe: [PATCH] Hardening memory maunipulation.
On 04/29/2015 08:39 AM, Shawn Chang wrote:
> From: Shawn C <citypw@gmail.com>
>
> Hi kernel maintainers,
>
> It won't allow the address above the TASK_SIZE being mmap'ed( or mprotect'ed).
> This patch is from PaX/Grsecurity.
>
> Thanks for your review time!

Does this actually reduce the attack surface of anything?

These functions all search for vmas. If there's a vma outside of the
user range, we have a problem.

Also, that use of TASK_SIZE is IMO ridiculous. Shouldn't be TASK_SIZE_MAX?

--Andy, who is annoyed every time another pointless TIF_IA32 reference,
even hidden in a macro, makes it into the kernel


\
 
 \ /
  Last update: 2015-04-30 00:21    [W:0.029 / U:3.384 seconds]
©2003-2020 Jasper Spaans|hosted at Digital Ocean and TransIP|Read the blog|Advertise on this site