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SubjectRe: [PATCHv3 man-pages 3/3] open.2: describe O_BENEATH flag
On 9 March 2015 at 16:16, David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com> wrote:
> On Mon, Mar 9, 2015 at 2:32 PM, Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
> <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> wrote:
>> On 03/09/2015 03:00 PM, David Drysdale wrote:
>>> Signed-off-by: David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com>
>>
>> Hi David,
>>
>> The text looks good insofar as it goes. But, it would be helpful
>> to have sentence or to that explains why this flag exists.
>> Could you add that, please?
>>
>> Thanks,
>>
>> Michael
>
> How about something like:
>
> This feature allows applications to be sure that the opened file
> is within the specified directory, regardless of the original
> source of the pathname argument. Some security-conscious pro‐
> grams may further ensure this by imposing a system call filter
> (with seccomp(2)) that requires this flag for all open() opera‐
> tions, so that the program cannot open files outside of speci‐
> fied directories even if subverted.
>
> (Also, I realize that I somehow failed to notice that the flags
> are listed in alphabetical order, so I'll move the text up, as
> in the updated diff below).

That looks good to me. Thanks!

Cheers,

Michael


> ---
> man2/open.2 | 44 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 1 file changed, 44 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/man2/open.2 b/man2/open.2
> index 956531b24b26..ece1fa90775a 100644
> --- a/man2/open.2
> +++ b/man2/open.2
> @@ -201,6 +201,43 @@ See
> for further details.
> See also BUGS, below.
> .TP
> +.B O_BENEATH " (since Linux 4.??)"
> +Ensure that the
> +.I pathname
> +is beneath the current working directory (for
> +.BR open (2))
> +or the
> +.I dirfd
> +(for
> +.BR openat (2)).
> +If the
> +.I pathname
> +is absolute or contains a path component of "..", the
> +.BR open ()
> +fails with the error
> +.BR EPERM.
> +This occurs even if ".." path component would not actually
> +escape the original directory; for example, a
> +.I pathname
> +of "subdir/../filename" would be rejected.
> +Path components that are symbolic links to absolute paths, or that are
> +relative paths containing a ".." component, will also cause the
> +.BR open ()
> +operation to fail with the error
> +.BR EPERM.
> +
> +This feature allows applications to be sure that the opened file is
> +within the specified directory, regardless of the original source of the
> +.I pathname
> +argument.
> +Some security-conscious programs may further ensure
> +this by imposing a system call filter (with
> +.BR seccomp (2))
> +that requires this flag for all
> +.BR open ()
> +operations, so that the program cannot open files outside of
> +specified directories even if subverted.
> +.TP
> .BR O_CLOEXEC " (since Linux 2.6.23)"
> .\" NOTE! several other man pages refer to this text
> Enable the close-on-exec flag for the new file descriptor.
> @@ -984,6 +1021,13 @@ did not match the owner of the file and the
> caller was not privileged
> The operation was prevented by a file seal; see
> .BR fcntl (2).
> .TP
> +.B EPERM
> +The
> +.B O_BENEATH
> +flag was specified and the
> +.I pathname
> +was not beneath the relevant directory.
> +.TP
> .B EROFS
> .I pathname
> refers to a file on a read-only filesystem and write access was
> --
> 2.2.0.rc0.207.ga3a616c



--
Michael Kerrisk
Linux man-pages maintainer; http://www.kernel.org/doc/man-pages/
Linux/UNIX System Programming Training: http://man7.org/training/


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