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SubjectRe: [PATCH v2] crypto: AES-NI - fix memory usage in GCM decryption
On Thu, Mar 12, 2015 at 09:17:51AM +0100, Stephan Mueller wrote:
> The kernel crypto API logic requires the caller to provide the
> length of (ciphertext || authentication tag) as cryptlen for the
> AEAD decryption operation. Thus, the cipher implementation must
> calculate the size of the plaintext output itself and cannot simply use
> cryptlen.
> The RFC4106 GCM decryption operation tries to overwrite cryptlen memory
> in req->dst. As the destination buffer for decryption only needs to hold
> the plaintext memory but cryptlen references the input buffer holding
> (ciphertext || authentication tag), the assumption of the destination
> buffer length in RFC4106 GCM operation leads to a too large size. This
> patch simply uses the already calculated plaintext size.
> In addition, this patch fixes the offset calculation of the AAD buffer
> pointer: as mentioned before, cryptlen already includes the size of the
> tag. Thus, the tag does not need to be added. With the addition, the AAD
> will be written beyond the already allocated buffer.
> Note, this fixes a kernel crash that can be triggered from user space
> via AF_ALG(aead) -- simply use the libkcapi test application
> from [1] and update it to use rfc4106-gcm-aes.
> Using [1], the changes were tested using CAVS vectors to demonstrate
> that the crypto operation still delivers the right results.
> [1]
> CC: Tadeusz Struk <>
> Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <>

Patch applied. Thanks!
Email: Herbert Xu <>
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