Messages in this thread | | | From | Paul Moore <> | Date | Fri, 23 Oct 2015 22:24:12 -0400 | Subject | Re: Should audit_seccomp check audit_enabled? |
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On October 23, 2015 5:30:45 PM Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> wrote:
> On Fri, Oct 23, 2015 at 2:22 PM, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote: >> On Fri, Oct 23, 2015 at 2:07 PM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> wrote: >>> On Oct 23, 2015 10:01 AM, "Kees Cook" <keescook@chromium.org> wrote: >>>> >>>> On Fri, Oct 23, 2015 at 9:19 AM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> wrote: >>>> > I would argue that, if auditing is off, audit_seccomp shouldn't do >>>> > anything. After all, unlike e.g. selinux, seccomp is not a systemwide >>>> > policy, and seccomp signals might be ordinary behavior that's internal >>>> > to the seccomp-using application. IOW, for people with audit compiled >>>> > in and subscribed by journald but switched off, I think that the >>>> > records shouldn't be emitted. >>>> > >>>> > If you agree, I can send the two-line patch. >>>> >>>> I think signr==0 states (which I would identify as "intended >>>> behavior") don't need to be reported under any situation, but audit >>>> folks wanted to keep it around. >>> >>> Even if there is a nonzero signr, it could just be a program opting to >>> trap and emulate one of its own syscalls. >> >> At present, that is a rare situation. Programs tend to be ptrace >> managed externally. Is there anything catching SIGSYS itself? >> > > I wrote one once. I also wrote a whole set of patches for libseccomp > to make it easier that never went anywhere -- I should dust those off > and package them into their own library.
It has been a while since we discussed those patches, but if I remember correctly it was going to be very difficult to do it in an arch agnostic way and that was a concern.
-- paul moore www.paul-moore.com
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