lkml.org 
[lkml]   [2015]   [Oct]   [12]   [last100]   RSS Feed
Views: [wrap][no wrap]   [headers]  [forward] 
 
Messages in this thread
/
Date
From
SubjectRe: GPF in shm_lock ipc
On Mon, Oct 12, 2015 at 10:49:45AM -0700, Davidlohr Bueso wrote:
> On Mon, 12 Oct 2015, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
>
> >On Mon, Oct 12, 2015 at 11:55:44AM +0200, Dmitry Vyukov wrote:
> >Here's slightly simplified and more human readable reproducer:
> >
> >#define _GNU_SOURCE
> >#include <stdlib.h>
> >#include <sys/ipc.h>
> >#include <sys/mman.h>
> >#include <sys/shm.h>
> >
> >#define PAGE_SIZE 4096
> >
> >int main()
> >{
> > int id;
> > void *p;
> >
> > id = shmget(IPC_PRIVATE, 3 * PAGE_SIZE, 0);
> > p = shmat(id, NULL, 0);
> > shmctl(id, IPC_RMID, NULL);
> > remap_file_pages(p, 3 * PAGE_SIZE, 0, 7, 0);
> >
> > return 0;
> >}
>
> Thanks!
>
> >>
> >>On commit dd36d7393d6310b0c1adefb22fba79c3cf8a577c
> >>(git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git)
> >>
> >>------------[ cut here ]------------
> >>WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 2636 at ipc/shm.c:162 shm_open+0x74/0x80()
> >>Modules linked in:
> >>CPU: 2 PID: 2636 Comm: a.out Not tainted 4.3.0-rc3+ #37
> >>Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
> >> ffffffff81bcb43c ffff88081bf0bd70 ffffffff812fe8d6 0000000000000000
> >> ffff88081bf0bda8 ffffffff81051ff1 ffffffffffffffea ffff88081b896ca8
> >> ffff880819b81620 ffff8800bbaa6d00 ffff880819b81600 ffff88081bf0bdb8
> >>Call Trace:
> >> [< inline >] __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:15
> >> [<ffffffff812fe8d6>] dump_stack+0x44/0x5e lib/dump_stack.c:50
> >> [<ffffffff81051ff1>] warn_slowpath_common+0x81/0xc0 kernel/panic.c:447
> >> [<ffffffff810520e5>] warn_slowpath_null+0x15/0x20 kernel/panic.c:480
> >> [< inline >] shm_lock ipc/shm.c:162
> >> [<ffffffff81295c64>] shm_open+0x74/0x80 ipc/shm.c:196
> >> [<ffffffff81295cbe>] shm_mmap+0x4e/0x80 ipc/shm.c:399 (discriminator 2)
> >> [<ffffffff81142d14>] mmap_region+0x3c4/0x5e0 mm/mmap.c:1627
> >> [<ffffffff81143227>] do_mmap+0x2f7/0x3d0 mm/mmap.c:1402
> >> [< inline >] do_mmap_pgoff include/linux/mm.h:1930
> >> [< inline >] SYSC_remap_file_pages mm/mmap.c:2694
> >> [<ffffffff811434a9>] SyS_remap_file_pages+0x179/0x240 mm/mmap.c:2641
> >> [<ffffffff81859a97>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6a
> >>arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:185
> >>---[ end trace 0873e743fc645a8c ]---
> >
> >Okay. The problem is that SysV IPC SHM doesn't expect the memory region to
> >be mmap'ed after IPC_RMID, but remap_file_pages() manages to create new
> >VMA using existing one.
>
> Indeed, naughty users should not be mapping/(re)attaching after IPC_RMID.
> This is common to all things ipc, not only to shm. And while Linux nowadays
> does enforce that nothing touch a segment marked for deletion[1], we have
> contradictory scenarios where the resource is only freed once the last attached
> process exits.
>
> [1] https://lkml.org/lkml/2015/10/12/483
>
> So this warning used to in fact be a full BUG_ON, but ultimately the ipc
> subsystem acknowledges that this situation is possible but fully blames the
> user responsible, and therefore we only warn about bogus usage.
>
> >I'm not sure what the right way to fix it. The SysV SHM VMA is pretty
> >normal from mm POV (no special flags, etc.) and it meats remap_file_pages
> >criteria (shared mapping). Every fix I can think of on mm side is ugly.
> >
> >Probably better to teach shm_mmap() to fall off gracefully in case of
> >non-existing shmid? I'm not familiar with IPC code.
> >Could anyone look into it?
>
> Yeah, this was my approach as well. Very little tested other than it solves
> the above warning. Basically we don't want to be doing mmap if the segment
> was deleted, thus return a corresponding error instead of triggering the
> same error later on after mmaping, via shm_open(). I still need to think
> a bit more about this, but seems legit if we don't hurt userspace while
> at it (at least the idea, not considering any overhead in doing the idr
> lookup). Thoughts?
>
> Thanks,
> Davidlohr
>
> diff --git a/ipc/shm.c b/ipc/shm.c
> index 4178727..9615f19 100644
> --- a/ipc/shm.c
> +++ b/ipc/shm.c
> @@ -385,9 +385,25 @@ static struct mempolicy *shm_get_policy(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
> static int shm_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
> {
> - struct shm_file_data *sfd = shm_file_data(file);
> + struct file *vma_file = vma->vm_file;
> + struct shm_file_data *sfd = shm_file_data(vma_file);
> + struct ipc_ids *ids = &shm_ids(sfd->ns);
> + struct kern_ipc_perm *shp;
> int ret;
> + rcu_read_lock();
> + shp = ipc_obtain_object_check(ids, sfd->id);
> + if (IS_ERR(shp)) {
> + ret = -EINVAL;
> + goto err;
> + }
> +
> + if (!ipc_valid_object(shp)) {
> + ret = -EIDRM;
> + goto err;
> + }
> + rcu_read_unlock();
> +

Hm. Isn't it racy? What prevents IPC_RMID from happening after this point?
Shouldn't we bump shm_nattch here? Or some other refcount?


> ret = sfd->file->f_op->mmap(sfd->file, vma);
> if (ret != 0)
> return ret;
> @@ -399,6 +415,9 @@ static int shm_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
> shm_open(vma);
> return ret;
> +err:
> + rcu_read_unlock();
> + return ret;
> }
> static int shm_release(struct inode *ino, struct file *file)
>
>
>
>
>
>

--
Kirill A. Shutemov


\
 
 \ /
  Last update: 2015-10-12 20:21    [W:0.067 / U:0.200 seconds]
©2003-2020 Jasper Spaans|hosted at Digital Ocean and TransIP|Read the blog|Advertise on this site