Messages in this thread | | | Date | Thu, 3 Jul 2014 21:44:12 +0800 | From | Herbert Xu <> | Subject | Re: [PATCH v2] crypto/fips: only panic on bad/missing crypto mod signatures |
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On Wed, Jul 02, 2014 at 03:37:30PM -0400, Jarod Wilson wrote: > Per further discussion with NIST, the requirements for FIPS state that > we only need to panic the system on failed kernel module signature checks > for crypto subsystem modules. This moves the fips-mode-only module > signature check out of the generic module loading code, into the crypto > subsystem, at points where we can catch both algorithm module loads and > mode module loads. At the same time, make CONFIG_CRYPTO_FIPS dependent on > CONFIG_MODULE_SIG, as this is entirely necessary for FIPS mode. > > v2: remove extraneous blank line, perform checks in static inline > function, drop no longer necessary fips.h include. > > CC: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> > CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> > CC: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> > CC: Stephan Mueller <stephan.mueller@atsec.com> > CC: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org > Signed-off-by: Jarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com>
Patch applied. -- Email: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/ PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt
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