Messages in this thread | | | From | Andy Lutomirski <> | Date | Mon, 9 Jun 2014 15:35:02 -0700 | Subject | Re: [PATCH 1/2] auditsc: audit_krule mask accesses need bounds checking |
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On Mon, Jun 9, 2014 at 3:30 PM, Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > On Wed, May 28, 2014 at 11:09:58PM -0400, Eric Paris wrote: >> From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> >> >> Fixes an easy DoS and possible information disclosure. >> >> This does nothing about the broken state of x32 auditing. >> >> eparis: If the admin has enabled auditd and has specifically loaded audit >> rules. This bug has been around since before git. Wow... >> >> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org >> Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> >> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> >> --- >> kernel/auditsc.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++--------- >> 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) > > Did this patch get dropped somewhere? Isn't it a valid bugfix, or did I > miss a later conversation about this?
Hmm. It seems that it didn't make it into Linus' tree. Crap.
IMO we need some kind of real tracking system for issues reported to security@. This shouldn't have been possible (and if I'd realized that the patch got dropped, I wouldn't have publicly disclosed it).
For whoever applies this: it's CVE-2014-3917.
--Andy
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