Messages in this thread | | | From | Andy Lutomirski <> | Date | Mon, 2 Jun 2014 14:17:49 -0700 | Subject | Re: [PATCH v5 0/6] seccomp: add PR_SECCOMP_EXT and SECCOMP_EXT_ACT_TSYNC |
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On Mon, Jun 2, 2014 at 1:06 PM, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote: > On Mon, Jun 2, 2014 at 12:59 PM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> wrote: >> On Mon, Jun 2, 2014 at 12:47 PM, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote: >>> Hi Andrew, >>> >>> Would you be willing to carry this series? Andy Lutomirski appears >>> happy with it now. (Thanks again for all the feedback Andy!) If so, it >>> has a relatively small merge conflict with the bpf changes living in >>> net-next. Would you prefer I rebase against net-next, let sfr handle >>> it, get carried in net-next, or some other option? >> >> Well, I'm still not entirely convinced that we want to have this much >> multiplexing in a prctl, and I'm still a bit unconvinced that the code > > I don't want to get caught without interface argument flexibility > again, so that's why the prctl interface is being set up that way.
I was thinking that a syscall might be a lot prettier. It may pay to cc linux-api, too.
I'll offer you a deal: if you try to come up with a nice, clean syscall, I'll try to write a fast(er) path for x86_64 to reduce overhead. I bet I can save 90-100ns per syscall. :)
> >> wouldn't be better off it it were completely atomic in the sense that >> it would either work or fail without doing anything. > > Getting perfect atomic operation looks extremely hard given task > locking. If this could get fixed in the future, it would have no > impact on the interface. At present, the corner case of the racing > thread is small enough that just catching the race failure is > sufficient. If task locking is improved in the future, it could just > simply never lose a race. Userspace still needs to handle errors no > matter what is the non-race failure condition (mode 1 or forked > filter) still exists. >
I think it's doable -- I just replied to the other thread.
> -Kees > > -- > Kees Cook > Chrome OS Security
-- Andy Lutomirski AMA Capital Management, LLC
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