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Subject[ 8/9] auditsc: audit_krule mask accesses need bounds checking
2.6.32-longterm review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>

Fixes an easy DoS and possible information disclosure.

This does nothing about the broken state of x32 auditing.

eparis: If the admin has enabled auditd and has specifically loaded
audit rules. This bug has been around since before git. Wow...

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
(cherry picked from commit a3c54931199565930d6d84f4c3456f6440aefd41)
[wt: no audit_filter_inode_name(), applied to audit_filter_inodes() instead]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
---
kernel/auditsc.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++++-------
1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 267e484..b6998ef 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -680,6 +680,22 @@ static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk, char **key)
return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
}

+static int audit_in_mask(const struct audit_krule *rule, unsigned long val)
+{
+ int word, bit;
+
+ if (val > 0xffffffff)
+ return false;
+
+ word = AUDIT_WORD(val);
+ if (word >= AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE)
+ return false;
+
+ bit = AUDIT_BIT(val);
+
+ return rule->mask[word] & bit;
+}
+
/* At syscall entry and exit time, this filter is called if the
* audit_state is not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is
* also not high enough that we already know we have to write an audit
@@ -697,11 +713,8 @@ static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk,

rcu_read_lock();
if (!list_empty(list)) {
- int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
- int bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
-
list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
- if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit &&
+ if (audit_in_mask(&e->rule, ctx->major) &&
audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, NULL,
&state)) {
rcu_read_unlock();
@@ -730,8 +743,6 @@ void audit_filter_inodes(struct task_struct *tsk, struct audit_context *ctx)

rcu_read_lock();
for (i = 0; i < ctx->name_count; i++) {
- int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
- int bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
struct audit_names *n = &ctx->names[i];
int h = audit_hash_ino((u32)n->ino);
struct list_head *list = &audit_inode_hash[h];
@@ -740,7 +751,7 @@ void audit_filter_inodes(struct task_struct *tsk, struct audit_context *ctx)
continue;

list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
- if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit &&
+ if (audit_in_mask(&e->rule, ctx->major) &&
audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, n, &state)) {
rcu_read_unlock();
ctx->current_state = state;
--
1.7.12.2.21.g234cd45.dirty




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