Messages in this thread | | | Date | Mon, 19 May 2014 23:49:22 +0930 | From | David Newall <> | Subject | Re: Revert 462fb2af9788a82a534f8184abfde31574e1cfa0 (bridge : Sanitize skb before it enters the IP stack) |
| |
Thanks for the reply. I've been hanging out for it!
On 19/05/14 23:31, Florian Westphal wrote: > Well, did you test what happens if we try to refrag a packet > containing ip options after the revert? > > can happen e.g. when using netfilter conntrack on top of a bridge.
No. I expect it would panic, as was reported prior to the commit.
I tried to persevere with the commit: I recalculated checksum, which left routes and times improperly updated in options. Then I tried calling ip_forward_options, which looks like it would correctly update RR and TS (not to mention checksum)m but that bombed because skb_rtable returned NULL. I think calling skb_set_dst would answer that, but I don't know how to get a valid dst. (I asked for help but no answer.)
I see three ways to progress:
1. Possibly call ip_forward_option, but that requires somebody who understands this code to help; 2. Just recalculate the checksum, leaving crap in the options; or 3. Revert the commit.
Option 1 doesn't look like it's going to happen; option 2 is stupid; leaving option 3, and I begin to think that's the right way to go if bridge is supposed to be a bridge and not a router. The idea that bridge is doing too much seems to have quite a lot of currency, so think of reversion as chopping off a canker. Or we keep fixing bugs, adding to bridge, until it replicates all of IP.
How does a packet get fragmented in this case? Does it only happen when bridging to a device with smaller MTU? That scenario sounds quite un-bridge-like. It also sounds like something that can be handled by real routing.
| |