For both of these, though, it is really kind of broken that it is a global switch, whereas typically only one application on the whole system needs it, so it would be much better to have application-specific controls.  How to do that is another matter...

On April 14, 2014 12:27:56 AM PDT, Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> wrote:
>
>* H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> wrote:
>
>> On 04/11/2014 11:41 AM, Linus Torvalds wrote:
>> > 
>> > Ok, so you actually do this on x86-64, and it currently works? For
>> > some reason I thought that 16-bit windows apps already didn't work.
>> > 
>> 
>> Some will work, because not all 16-bit software care about the upper
>> half of ESP getting randomly corrupted.
>> 
>> That is the "functionality bit" of the problem.  The other bit, of
>> course, is that that random corruption is the address of the kernel
>stack.
>> 
>> > Because if we have working users of this, then I don't think we can
>do
>> > the "we don't support 16-bit segments", or at least we need to make
>it
>> > runtime configurable.
>> 
>> I'll let you pick what the policy should be here.  I personally 
>> think that we have to be able to draw a line somewhere sometimes 
>> (Microsoft themselves haven't supported running 16-bit binaries for 
>> several Windows generations now), but it is your policy, not mine.
>
>I think the mmap_min_addr model works pretty well:
>
> - it defaults to secure
>
> - allow a security policy to grant an exception to a known package, 
>   built by the distro
>
> - end user can also grant an exception
>
>This essentially punts any 'makes the system less secure' exceptions 
>to the distro and the end user.
>
>Thanks,
>
>	Ingo

-- 
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