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SubjectRe: [PATCH 0/6] File Sealing & memfd_create()
On Thu, Apr 10, 2014 at 1:49 PM, David Herrmann <> wrote:
> Hi
> On Thu, Apr 10, 2014 at 10:37 PM, Andy Lutomirski <> wrote:
>> It occurs to me that, before going nuts with these kinds of flags, it
>> may pay to just try to fix the /proc/self/fd issue for real -- we
>> could just make open("/proc/self/fd/3", O_RDWR) fail if fd 3 is
>> read-only. That may be enough for the file sealing thing.
> For the sealing API, none of this is needed. As long as the inode is
> owned by the uid who creates the memfd, you can pass it around and
> no-one besides root and you can open /proc/self/fd/$fd (assuming chmod
> 700). If you share the fd with someone with the same uid as you,
> you're screwed anyway. We don't protect users against themselves (I
> mean, they can ptrace you, or kill()..). Therefore, I'm not really
> convinced that we want this for memfd. At least no-one has provided a
> _proper_ use-case for this so far.

Hmm. Fair enough.

Would it make sense for the initial mode on a memfd inode to be 000?
Anyone who finds this to be problematic could use fchmod to fix it.

I might even go so far as to suggest that the default uid on the inode
should be 0 (i.e. global root), since there is the odd corner case of
root setting euid != 0, creating a memfd, and setting euid back to 0.
The latter might cause resource accounting issues, though.


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