[lkml]   [2014]   [Apr]   [10]   [last100]   RSS Feed
Views: [wrap][no wrap]   [headers]  [forward] 
Messages in this thread
SubjectRe: [PATCH 0/6] File Sealing & memfd_create()
On 04/08/2014 06:00 AM, Florian Weimer wrote:
> On 03/19/2014 08:06 PM, David Herrmann wrote:
>> Unlike existing techniques that provide similar protection, sealing
>> allows
>> file-sharing without any trust-relationship. This is enforced by
>> rejecting seal
>> modifications if you don't own an exclusive reference to the given
>> file. So if
>> you own a file-descriptor, you can be sure that no-one besides you can
>> modify
>> the seals on the given file. This allows mapping shared files from
>> untrusted
>> parties without the fear of the file getting truncated or modified by an
>> attacker.
> How do you keep these promises on network and FUSE file systems? Surely
> there is still some trust involved for such descriptors?
> What happens if you create a loop device on a sealed descriptor?
> Why does memfd_create not create a file backed by a memory region in the
> current process? Wouldn't this be a far more generic primitive?
> Creating aliases of memory regions would be interesting for many things
> (not just libffi bypassing SELinux-enforced NX restrictions :-).

If you write a patch to prevent selinux from enforcing NX, I will ack
that patch with all my might. I don't know how far it would get me, but
I think that selinux has no business going anywhere near execmem.

Adding a clone mode to mremap might be a better bet. But memfd solves
that problem, too, albeit messily.


 \ /
  Last update: 2014-04-10 21:21    [W:0.349 / U:34.228 seconds]
©2003-2018 Jasper Spaans|hosted at Digital Ocean and TransIP|Read the blog|Advertise on this site