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SubjectRe: [PATCH 0/6] File Sealing & memfd_create()

On Thu, Mar 20, 2014 at 3:41 PM, One Thousand Gnomes
<> wrote:
> I think you want two things at minimum
> owner to seal
> root can always override

Why should root be allowed to override?

> I would query the name too. Right now your assumption is 'shmem only' but
> that might change with other future use cases or types (eg some driver
> file handles) so SHMEM_ in the fcntl might become misleading.

I'm fine with F_SET/GET_SEALS. But given you suggested requiring
MFD_ALLOW_SEALS for sealing, I don't see why we couldn't limit this
interface entirely to memfd_create().

> Whether you want some way to undo a seal without an exclusive reference as
> the file owner is another question.

No. You are never allowed to undo a seal but with an exclusive
reference. This interface was created for situations _without_ any
trust relationship. So if the owner is allowed to undo seals, the
interface doesn't make any sense. The only options I see is to not
allow un-sealing at all (which I'm fine with) or tracking users (which
is way too much overhead).


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