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SubjectRe: [PATCH 0/6] File Sealing & memfd_create()
> My first idea was to add MFD_ALLOW_SEALING as memfd_create() flag,
> which enables the sealing-API for that file. Then I looked at POSIX

This actually seems the most sensible to me. The reason being that if I
have some existing used object there is no way on earth I can be sure who
has existing references to it, and we don't have revoke() to fix that.

So it pretty much has to be a new object in a sane programming model.

> mandatory locking and noticed that it provides similar restrictions on
> _all_ files. Mandatory locks can be more easily removed, but an

The fact someone got it past a standards body doesn't make it a good idea.

> attacker could just re-apply them in a loop, so that's not really an
> argument. Furthermore, sealing requires _write_ access so I wonder
> what kind of DoS attacks are possible with sealing that are not
> already possible with write access? And sealing is only possible if no
> writable, shared mapping exists. So even if an attacker seals a file,
> all that happens is EPERM, not SIGBUS (still a possible
> denial-of-service scenario).

I think you want two things at minimum

owner to seal
root can always override

I would query the name too. Right now your assumption is 'shmem only' but
that might change with other future use cases or types (eg some driver
file handles) so SHMEM_ in the fcntl might become misleading.

Whether you want some way to undo a seal without an exclusive reference as
the file owner is another question.


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