Messages in this thread | | | From | Matthew Garrett <> | Subject | Re: Trusted kernel patchset for Secure Boot lockdown | Date | Fri, 14 Mar 2014 15:58:02 +0000 |
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On Fri, 2014-03-14 at 08:54 -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> All the more reason to ignore command line at this point. For Chrome > OS, it's part of our boot state, so we don't care about it. For > generic Secure Boot, we can add checks for dangerous stuff as we go > forward. That's why I like this interface -- we can add to it as we > identify bad stuff, and it stay separate from other semantics.
Sure, it's just another reason not to want to use a capability-based interface - not all the policy we want to impose is related to processes, so capabilities really don't make sense. The current patchset adds a restriction to the acpi_rsdp argument, and I've no objection to adding one to limit the use of mem=.
-- Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
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