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    Date
    SubjectRe: [PATCH 08/13] KEYS: Overhaul key identification when searching for asymmetric keys
    From
    On 2 October 2014 19:04, Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com> wrote:
    > On 02/10/14 18:49, Dmitry Kasatkin wrote:
    >> Hi David,
    >>
    >> I just took latest #next branch from James's security tree which
    >> includes latest KEYs patches and noticed following:
    >>
    >> [ 9.812332] Request for unknown module key 'Magrathea: Glacier
    >> signing key: 926305d6dda66f47139eb4e3cb25a6adef527f08' err -11
    >>
    >> Also I noticed that output of 'keyctl show' and 'cat /proc/keys' output
    >> also has changed in respect of certificate ids..
    >>
    >> Those ids does not look any close to my kernel X509 X509v3 Subject Key
    >> Identifier, which is:
    >> 92:63:05:D6:DD:A6:6F:47:13:9E:B4:E3:CB:25:A6:AD:EF:52:7F:08
    >>
    >> proc/keys shows
    >>
    >> symmetri Magrathea: Glacier signing key: d9e2e4c6951f1e83: X509.RSA
    >> 6865612e68326732 []
    >>


    Ok.. d9e2e4c6951f1e83 is serial number.

    What is this 6865612e68326732?

    Does it still support searching for the key by partially matching
    Subject Key Identifier?


    - Dmitry

    >> Very different ids..
    >>
    >> How could I match certificate now?
    >> Module verification code cannot find needed key..
    >>
    >> - Dmitry
    >
    >
    > Hehe. Also now I get kernel Oops in asymmetric_key_id_same...
    >
    > -------------------------
    > [ 132.816522] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at
    > ffffffffffffffea
    > [ 132.819902] IP: [<ffffffff812bfc20>] asymmetric_key_id_same+0x14/0x36
    > [ 132.820302] PGD 1a12067 PUD 1a14067 PMD 0
    > [ 132.820302] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
    > [ 132.820302] Modules linked in: bridge(E) stp(E) llc(E) evdev(E)
    > serio_raw(E) i2c_piix4(E) button(E) fuse(E)
    > [ 132.820302] CPU: 0 PID: 2993 Comm: cat Tainted: G E
    > 3.16.0-kds+ #2847
    > [ 132.820302] Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
    > [ 132.820302] task: ffff88004249a430 ti: ffff880056640000 task.ti:
    > ffff880056640000
    > [ 132.820302] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff812bfc20>] [<ffffffff812bfc20>]
    > asymmetric_key_id_same+0x14/0x36
    > [ 132.820302] RSP: 0018:ffff880056643930 EFLAGS: 00010246
    > [ 132.820302] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffffffffffffea RCX:
    > ffff880056643ae0
    > [ 132.820302] RDX: 000000000000005e RSI: ffffffffffffffea RDI:
    > ffff88005bac9300
    > [ 132.820302] RBP: ffff880056643948 R08: 0000000000000003 R09:
    > 00000007504aa01a
    > [ 132.820302] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12:
    > ffff88005d68ca40
    > [ 132.820302] R13: 0000000000000101 R14: 0000000000000000 R15:
    > ffff88005bac5280
    > [ 132.820302] FS: 00007f67a153c740(0000) GS:ffff88005da00000(0000)
    > knlGS:0000000000000000
    > [ 132.820302] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
    > [ 132.820302] CR2: ffffffffffffffea CR3: 000000002e663000 CR4:
    > 00000000000006f0
    > [ 132.820302] Stack:
    > [ 132.820302] ffffffff812bfc66 ffff880056643ae0 ffff88005bac5280
    > ffff880056643958
    > [ 132.820302] ffffffff812bfc9d ffff880056643980 ffffffff812971d9
    > ffff88005ce930c1
    > [ 132.820302] ffff88005ce930c0 0000000000000000 ffff8800566439c8
    > ffffffff812fb753
    > [ 132.820302] Call Trace:
    > [ 132.820302] [<ffffffff812bfc66>] ? asymmetric_match_key_ids+0x24/0x42
    > [ 132.820302] [<ffffffff812bfc9d>] asymmetric_key_cmp+0x19/0x1b
    > [ 132.820302] [<ffffffff812971d9>] keyring_search_iterator+0x74/0xd7
    > [ 132.820302] [<ffffffff812fb753>] assoc_array_subtree_iterate+0x67/0xd2
    > [ 132.820302] [<ffffffff81297165>] ? key_default_cmp+0x20/0x20
    > [ 132.820302] [<ffffffff812fbaa1>] assoc_array_iterate+0x19/0x1e
    > [ 132.820302] [<ffffffff81297332>] search_nested_keyrings+0xf6/0x2b6
    > [ 132.820302] [<ffffffff810728da>] ? sched_clock_cpu+0x91/0xa2
    > [ 132.820302] [<ffffffff810860d2>] ? mark_held_locks+0x58/0x6e
    > [ 132.820302] [<ffffffff810a137d>] ? current_kernel_time+0x77/0xb8
    > [ 132.820302] [<ffffffff81297871>] keyring_search_aux+0xe1/0x14c
    > [ 132.820302] [<ffffffff812977fc>] ? keyring_search_aux+0x6c/0x14c
    > [ 132.820302] [<ffffffff8129796b>] keyring_search+0x8f/0xb6
    > [ 132.820302] [<ffffffff812bfc84>] ? asymmetric_match_key_ids+0x42/0x42
    > [ 132.820302] [<ffffffff81297165>] ? key_default_cmp+0x20/0x20
    > [ 132.820302] [<ffffffff812ab9e3>] asymmetric_verify+0xa4/0x214
    > [ 132.820302] [<ffffffff812ab90e>] integrity_digsig_verify+0xb1/0xe2
    > [ 132.820302] [<ffffffff812abe41>] ? evm_verifyxattr+0x6a/0x7a
    > [ 132.820302] [<ffffffff812b0390>] ima_appraise_measurement+0x160/0x370
    > [ 132.820302] [<ffffffff81161db2>] ? d_absolute_path+0x5b/0x7a
    > [ 132.820302] [<ffffffff812ada30>] process_measurement+0x322/0x404
    >
    >
    >> On 08/09/14 18:38, David Howells wrote:
    >>> Make use of the new match string preparsing to overhaul key identification
    >>> when searching for asymmetric keys. The following changes are made:
    >>>
    >>> (1) Use the previously created asymmetric_key_id struct to hold the following
    >>> key IDs derived from the X.509 certificate or PKCS#7 message:
    >>>
    >>> id: serial number + issuer
    >>> skid: subjKeyId + subject
    >>> authority: authKeyId + issuer
    >>>
    >>> (2) Replace the hex fingerprint attached to key->type_data[1] with an
    >>> asymmetric_key_ids struct containing the id and the skid (if present).
    >>>
    >>> (3) Make the asymmetric_type match data preparse select one of two searches:
    >>>
    >>> (a) An iterative search for the key ID given if prefixed with "id:". The
    >>> prefix is expected to be followed by a hex string giving the ID to
    >>> search for. The criterion key ID is checked against all key IDs
    >>> recorded on the key.
    >>>
    >>> (b) A direct search if the key ID is not prefixed with "id:". This will
    >>> look for an exact match on the key description.
    >>>
    >>> (4) Make x509_request_asymmetric_key() take a key ID. This is then converted
    >>> into "id:<hex>" and passed into keyring_search() where match preparsing
    >>> will turn it back into a binary ID.
    >>>
    >>> (5) X.509 certificate verification then takes the authority key ID and looks
    >>> up a key that matches it to find the public key for the certificate
    >>> signature.
    >>>
    >>> (6) PKCS#7 certificate verification then takes the id key ID and looks up a
    >>> key that matches it to find the public key for the signed information
    >>> block signature.
    >>>
    >>> Additional changes:
    >>>
    >>> (1) Multiple subjKeyId and authKeyId values on an X.509 certificate cause the
    >>> cert to be rejected with -EBADMSG.
    >>>
    >>> (2) The 'fingerprint' ID is gone. This was primarily intended to convey PGP
    >>> public key fingerprints. If PGP is supported in future, this should
    >>> generate a key ID that carries the fingerprint.
    >>>
    >>> (3) Th ca_keyid= kernel command line option is now converted to a key ID and
    >>> used to match the authority key ID. Possibly this should only match the
    >>> actual authKeyId part and not the issuer as well.
    >>>
    >>> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
    >>> ---
    >>>
    >>> crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_keys.h | 4 -
    >>> crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c | 133 ++++++++++++-----------------
    >>> crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c | 38 ++++++--
    >>> crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h | 5 -
    >>> crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c | 6 -
    >>> crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c | 44 ++++------
    >>> crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c | 55 +++++++-----
    >>> crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h | 5 +
    >>> crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c | 89 +++++++++++--------
    >>> include/crypto/public_key.h | 5 +
    >>> 10 files changed, 198 insertions(+), 186 deletions(-)
    >>>
    >>> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_keys.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_keys.h
    >>> index 917be6b985e7..fd21ac28e0a0 100644
    >>> --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_keys.h
    >>> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_keys.h
    >>> @@ -9,13 +9,13 @@
    >>> * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
    >>> */
    >>>
    >>> -int asymmetric_keyid_match(const char *kid, const char *id);
    >>> extern bool asymmetric_match_key_ids(const struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids,
    >>> const struct asymmetric_key_id *match_id);
    >>>
    >>> extern struct asymmetric_key_id *asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id(const char *id);
    >>>
    >>> -static inline const char *asymmetric_key_id(const struct key *key)
    >>> +static inline
    >>> +const struct asymmetric_key_ids *asymmetric_key_ids(const struct key *key)
    >>> {
    >>> return key->type_data.p[1];
    >>> }
    >>> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c
    >>> index 3bc71b4e1eed..6f16f647d21b 100644
    >>> --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c
    >>> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c
    >>> @@ -105,76 +105,15 @@ struct asymmetric_key_id *asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id(const char *id)
    >>> }
    >>>
    >>> /*
    >>> - * Match asymmetric key id with partial match
    >>> - * @id: key id to match in a form "id:<id>"
    >>> - */
    >>> -int asymmetric_keyid_match(const char *kid, const char *id)
    >>> -{
    >>> - size_t idlen, kidlen;
    >>> -
    >>> - if (!kid || !id)
    >>> - return 0;
    >>> -
    >>> - /* make it possible to use id as in the request: "id:<id>" */
    >>> - if (strncmp(id, "id:", 3) == 0)
    >>> - id += 3;
    >>> -
    >>> - /* Anything after here requires a partial match on the ID string */
    >>> - idlen = strlen(id);
    >>> - kidlen = strlen(kid);
    >>> - if (idlen > kidlen)
    >>> - return 0;
    >>> -
    >>> - kid += kidlen - idlen;
    >>> - if (strcasecmp(id, kid) != 0)
    >>> - return 0;
    >>> -
    >>> - return 1;
    >>> -}
    >>> -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(asymmetric_keyid_match);
    >>> -
    >>> -/*
    >>> - * Match asymmetric keys on (part of) their name
    >>> - * We have some shorthand methods for matching keys. We allow:
    >>> - *
    >>> - * "<desc>" - request a key by description
    >>> - * "id:<id>" - request a key matching the ID
    >>> - * "<subtype>:<id>" - request a key of a subtype
    >>> + * Match asymmetric keys by ID.
    >>> */
    >>> static bool asymmetric_key_cmp(const struct key *key,
    >>> const struct key_match_data *match_data)
    >>> {
    >>> - const struct asymmetric_key_subtype *subtype = asymmetric_key_subtype(key);
    >>> - const char *description = match_data->raw_data;
    >>> - const char *spec = description;
    >>> - const char *id;
    >>> - ptrdiff_t speclen;
    >>> -
    >>> - if (!subtype || !spec || !*spec)
    >>> - return 0;
    >>> -
    >>> - /* See if the full key description matches as is */
    >>> - if (key->description && strcmp(key->description, description) == 0)
    >>> - return 1;
    >>> -
    >>> - /* All tests from here on break the criterion description into a
    >>> - * specifier, a colon and then an identifier.
    >>> - */
    >>> - id = strchr(spec, ':');
    >>> - if (!id)
    >>> - return 0;
    >>> -
    >>> - speclen = id - spec;
    >>> - id++;
    >>> -
    >>> - if (speclen == 2 && memcmp(spec, "id", 2) == 0)
    >>> - return asymmetric_keyid_match(asymmetric_key_id(key), id);
    >>> + const struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids = asymmetric_key_ids(key);
    >>> + const struct asymmetric_key_id *match_id = match_data->preparsed;
    >>>
    >>> - if (speclen == subtype->name_len &&
    >>> - memcmp(spec, subtype->name, speclen) == 0)
    >>> - return 1;
    >>> -
    >>> - return 0;
    >>> + return asymmetric_match_key_ids(kids, match_id);
    >>> }
    >>>
    >>> /*
    >>> @@ -191,8 +130,30 @@ static bool asymmetric_key_cmp(const struct key *key,
    >>> */
    >>> static int asymmetric_key_match_preparse(struct key_match_data *match_data)
    >>> {
    >>> - match_data->lookup_type = KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_ITERATE;
    >>> + struct asymmetric_key_id *match_id;
    >>> + const char *spec = match_data->raw_data;
    >>> + const char *id;
    >>> +
    >>> + if (!spec || !*spec)
    >>> + return -EINVAL;
    >>> + if (spec[0] == 'i' &&
    >>> + spec[1] == 'd' &&
    >>> + spec[2] == ':') {
    >>> + id = spec + 3;
    >>> + } else {
    >>> + goto default_match;
    >>> + }
    >>> +
    >>> + match_id = asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id(id);
    >>> + if (!match_id)
    >>> + return -ENOMEM;
    >>> +
    >>> + match_data->preparsed = match_id;
    >>> match_data->cmp = asymmetric_key_cmp;
    >>> + match_data->lookup_type = KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_ITERATE;
    >>> + return 0;
    >>> +
    >>> +default_match:
    >>> return 0;
    >>> }
    >>>
    >>> @@ -201,6 +162,7 @@ static int asymmetric_key_match_preparse(struct key_match_data *match_data)
    >>> */
    >>> static void asymmetric_key_match_free(struct key_match_data *match_data)
    >>> {
    >>> + kfree(match_data->preparsed);
    >>> }
    >>>
    >>> /*
    >>> @@ -209,8 +171,10 @@ static void asymmetric_key_match_free(struct key_match_data *match_data)
    >>> static void asymmetric_key_describe(const struct key *key, struct seq_file *m)
    >>> {
    >>> const struct asymmetric_key_subtype *subtype = asymmetric_key_subtype(key);
    >>> - const char *kid = asymmetric_key_id(key);
    >>> - size_t n;
    >>> + const struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids = asymmetric_key_ids(key);
    >>> + const struct asymmetric_key_id *kid;
    >>> + const unsigned char *p;
    >>> + int n;
    >>>
    >>> seq_puts(m, key->description);
    >>>
    >>> @@ -218,13 +182,16 @@ static void asymmetric_key_describe(const struct key *key, struct seq_file *m)
    >>> seq_puts(m, ": ");
    >>> subtype->describe(key, m);
    >>>
    >>> - if (kid) {
    >>> + if (kids && kids->id[0]) {
    >>> + kid = kids->id[0];
    >>> seq_putc(m, ' ');
    >>> - n = strlen(kid);
    >>> - if (n <= 8)
    >>> - seq_puts(m, kid);
    >>> - else
    >>> - seq_puts(m, kid + n - 8);
    >>> + n = kid->len;
    >>> + p = kid->data;
    >>> + if (n > 8) {
    >>> + p += n - 8;
    >>> + n = 8;
    >>> + }
    >>> + seq_printf(m, "%*phN", n, p);
    >>> }
    >>>
    >>> seq_puts(m, " [");
    >>> @@ -275,6 +242,7 @@ static int asymmetric_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
    >>> static void asymmetric_key_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
    >>> {
    >>> struct asymmetric_key_subtype *subtype = prep->type_data[0];
    >>> + struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids = prep->type_data[1];
    >>>
    >>> pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__);
    >>>
    >>> @@ -282,7 +250,11 @@ static void asymmetric_key_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
    >>> subtype->destroy(prep->payload[0]);
    >>> module_put(subtype->owner);
    >>> }
    >>> - kfree(prep->type_data[1]);
    >>> + if (kids) {
    >>> + kfree(kids->id[0]);
    >>> + kfree(kids->id[1]);
    >>> + kfree(kids);
    >>> + }
    >>> kfree(prep->description);
    >>> }
    >>>
    >>> @@ -292,13 +264,20 @@ static void asymmetric_key_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
    >>> static void asymmetric_key_destroy(struct key *key)
    >>> {
    >>> struct asymmetric_key_subtype *subtype = asymmetric_key_subtype(key);
    >>> + struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids = key->type_data.p[1];
    >>> +
    >>> if (subtype) {
    >>> subtype->destroy(key->payload.data);
    >>> module_put(subtype->owner);
    >>> key->type_data.p[0] = NULL;
    >>> }
    >>> - kfree(key->type_data.p[1]);
    >>> - key->type_data.p[1] = NULL;
    >>> +
    >>> + if (kids) {
    >>> + kfree(kids->id[0]);
    >>> + kfree(kids->id[1]);
    >>> + kfree(kids);
    >>> + key->type_data.p[1] = NULL;
    >>> + }
    >>> }
    >>>
    >>> struct key_type key_type_asymmetric = {
    >>> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c
    >>> index 459d2077c61b..ad6ae9d7c884 100644
    >>> --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c
    >>> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c
    >>> @@ -29,6 +29,10 @@ struct pkcs7_parse_context {
    >>> enum OID last_oid; /* Last OID encountered */
    >>> unsigned x509_index;
    >>> unsigned sinfo_index;
    >>> + const void *raw_serial;
    >>> + unsigned raw_serial_size;
    >>> + unsigned raw_issuer_size;
    >>> + const void *raw_issuer;
    >>> };
    >>>
    >>> /*
    >>> @@ -39,6 +43,7 @@ static void pkcs7_free_signed_info(struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo)
    >>> if (sinfo) {
    >>> mpi_free(sinfo->sig.mpi[0]);
    >>> kfree(sinfo->sig.digest);
    >>> + kfree(sinfo->signing_cert_id);
    >>> kfree(sinfo);
    >>> }
    >>> }
    >>> @@ -256,10 +261,10 @@ int pkcs7_extract_cert(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
    >>> if (IS_ERR(x509))
    >>> return PTR_ERR(x509);
    >>>
    >>> - pr_debug("Got cert for %s\n", x509->subject);
    >>> - pr_debug("- fingerprint %s\n", x509->fingerprint);
    >>> -
    >>> x509->index = ++ctx->x509_index;
    >>> + pr_debug("Got cert %u for %s\n", x509->index, x509->subject);
    >>> + pr_debug("- fingerprint %*phN\n", x509->id->len, x509->id->data);
    >>> +
    >>> *ctx->ppcerts = x509;
    >>> ctx->ppcerts = &x509->next;
    >>> return 0;
    >>> @@ -348,8 +353,8 @@ int pkcs7_sig_note_serial(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
    >>> const void *value, size_t vlen)
    >>> {
    >>> struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
    >>> - ctx->sinfo->raw_serial = value;
    >>> - ctx->sinfo->raw_serial_size = vlen;
    >>> + ctx->raw_serial = value;
    >>> + ctx->raw_serial_size = vlen;
    >>> return 0;
    >>> }
    >>>
    >>> @@ -361,8 +366,8 @@ int pkcs7_sig_note_issuer(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
    >>> const void *value, size_t vlen)
    >>> {
    >>> struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
    >>> - ctx->sinfo->raw_issuer = value;
    >>> - ctx->sinfo->raw_issuer_size = vlen;
    >>> + ctx->raw_issuer = value;
    >>> + ctx->raw_issuer_size = vlen;
    >>> return 0;
    >>> }
    >>>
    >>> @@ -395,10 +400,21 @@ int pkcs7_note_signed_info(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
    >>> const void *value, size_t vlen)
    >>> {
    >>> struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
    >>> -
    >>> - ctx->sinfo->index = ++ctx->sinfo_index;
    >>> - *ctx->ppsinfo = ctx->sinfo;
    >>> - ctx->ppsinfo = &ctx->sinfo->next;
    >>> + struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo = ctx->sinfo;
    >>> + struct asymmetric_key_id *kid;
    >>> +
    >>> + /* Generate cert issuer + serial number key ID */
    >>> + kid = asymmetric_key_generate_id(ctx->raw_serial,
    >>> + ctx->raw_serial_size,
    >>> + ctx->raw_issuer,
    >>> + ctx->raw_issuer_size);
    >>> + if (IS_ERR(kid))
    >>> + return PTR_ERR(kid);
    >>> +
    >>> + sinfo->signing_cert_id = kid;
    >>> + sinfo->index = ++ctx->sinfo_index;
    >>> + *ctx->ppsinfo = sinfo;
    >>> + ctx->ppsinfo = &sinfo->next;
    >>> ctx->sinfo = kzalloc(sizeof(struct pkcs7_signed_info), GFP_KERNEL);
    >>> if (!ctx->sinfo)
    >>> return -ENOMEM;
    >>> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h
    >>> index d25f4d15370f..91949f92bc72 100644
    >>> --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h
    >>> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h
    >>> @@ -33,10 +33,7 @@ struct pkcs7_signed_info {
    >>> const void *authattrs;
    >>>
    >>> /* Issuing cert serial number and issuer's name */
    >>> - const void *raw_serial;
    >>> - unsigned raw_serial_size;
    >>> - unsigned raw_issuer_size;
    >>> - const void *raw_issuer;
    >>> + struct asymmetric_key_id *signing_cert_id;
    >>>
    >>> /* Message signature.
    >>> *
    >>> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c
    >>> index e666eb011a85..4e8dd7214753 100644
    >>> --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c
    >>> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c
    >>> @@ -49,8 +49,7 @@ int pkcs7_validate_trust_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
    >>> /* Look to see if this certificate is present in the trusted
    >>> * keys.
    >>> */
    >>> - key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring, x509->subject,
    >>> - x509->fingerprint);
    >>> + key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring, x509->id);
    >>> if (!IS_ERR(key))
    >>> /* One of the X.509 certificates in the PKCS#7 message
    >>> * is apparently the same as one we already trust.
    >>> @@ -82,8 +81,7 @@ int pkcs7_validate_trust_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
    >>> return -ENOKEY;
    >>> }
    >>>
    >>> - key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring, last->issuer,
    >>> - last->authority);
    >>> + key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring, last->authority);
    >>> if (IS_ERR(key))
    >>> return PTR_ERR(key) == -ENOMEM ? -ENOMEM : -ENOKEY;
    >>> x509 = last;
    >>> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
    >>> index c62cf8006e1f..57e90fa17f2b 100644
    >>> --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
    >>> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
    >>> @@ -131,8 +131,7 @@ static int pkcs7_find_key(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
    >>> struct x509_certificate *x509;
    >>> unsigned certix = 1;
    >>>
    >>> - kenter("%u,%u,%u",
    >>> - sinfo->index, sinfo->raw_serial_size, sinfo->raw_issuer_size);
    >>> + kenter("%u", sinfo->index);
    >>>
    >>> for (x509 = pkcs7->certs; x509; x509 = x509->next, certix++) {
    >>> /* I'm _assuming_ that the generator of the PKCS#7 message will
    >>> @@ -140,21 +139,11 @@ static int pkcs7_find_key(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
    >>> * PKCS#7 message - but I can't be 100% sure of that. It's
    >>> * possible this will need element-by-element comparison.
    >>> */
    >>> - if (x509->raw_serial_size != sinfo->raw_serial_size ||
    >>> - memcmp(x509->raw_serial, sinfo->raw_serial,
    >>> - sinfo->raw_serial_size) != 0)
    >>> + if (!asymmetric_key_id_same(x509->id, sinfo->signing_cert_id))
    >>> continue;
    >>> pr_devel("Sig %u: Found cert serial match X.509[%u]\n",
    >>> sinfo->index, certix);
    >>>
    >>> - if (x509->raw_issuer_size != sinfo->raw_issuer_size ||
    >>> - memcmp(x509->raw_issuer, sinfo->raw_issuer,
    >>> - sinfo->raw_issuer_size) != 0) {
    >>> - pr_warn("Sig %u: X.509 subject and PKCS#7 issuer don't match\n",
    >>> - sinfo->index);
    >>> - continue;
    >>> - }
    >>> -
    >>> if (x509->pub->pkey_algo != sinfo->sig.pkey_algo) {
    >>> pr_warn("Sig %u: X.509 algo and PKCS#7 sig algo don't match\n",
    >>> sinfo->index);
    >>> @@ -164,8 +153,10 @@ static int pkcs7_find_key(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
    >>> sinfo->signer = x509;
    >>> return 0;
    >>> }
    >>> +
    >>> pr_warn("Sig %u: Issuing X.509 cert not found (#%*ph)\n",
    >>> - sinfo->index, sinfo->raw_serial_size, sinfo->raw_serial);
    >>> + sinfo->index,
    >>> + sinfo->signing_cert_id->len, sinfo->signing_cert_id->data);
    >>> return -ENOKEY;
    >>> }
    >>>
    >>> @@ -184,7 +175,9 @@ static int pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
    >>> p->seen = false;
    >>>
    >>> for (;;) {
    >>> - pr_debug("verify %s: %s\n", x509->subject, x509->fingerprint);
    >>> + pr_debug("verify %s: %*phN\n",
    >>> + x509->subject,
    >>> + x509->raw_serial_size, x509->raw_serial);
    >>> x509->seen = true;
    >>> ret = x509_get_sig_params(x509);
    >>> if (ret < 0)
    >>> @@ -192,7 +185,8 @@ static int pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
    >>>
    >>> pr_debug("- issuer %s\n", x509->issuer);
    >>> if (x509->authority)
    >>> - pr_debug("- authkeyid %s\n", x509->authority);
    >>> + pr_debug("- authkeyid %*phN\n",
    >>> + x509->authority->len, x509->authority->data);
    >>>
    >>> if (!x509->authority ||
    >>> strcmp(x509->subject, x509->issuer) == 0) {
    >>> @@ -218,13 +212,14 @@ static int pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
    >>> /* Look through the X.509 certificates in the PKCS#7 message's
    >>> * list to see if the next one is there.
    >>> */
    >>> - pr_debug("- want %s\n", x509->authority);
    >>> + pr_debug("- want %*phN\n",
    >>> + x509->authority->len, x509->authority->data);
    >>> for (p = pkcs7->certs; p; p = p->next) {
    >>> - pr_debug("- cmp [%u] %s\n", p->index, p->fingerprint);
    >>> - if (p->raw_subject_size == x509->raw_issuer_size &&
    >>> - strcmp(p->fingerprint, x509->authority) == 0 &&
    >>> - memcmp(p->raw_subject, x509->raw_issuer,
    >>> - x509->raw_issuer_size) == 0)
    >>> + if (!p->skid)
    >>> + continue;
    >>> + pr_debug("- cmp [%u] %*phN\n",
    >>> + p->index, p->skid->len, p->skid->data);
    >>> + if (asymmetric_key_id_same(p->skid, x509->authority))
    >>> goto found_issuer;
    >>> }
    >>>
    >>> @@ -233,7 +228,7 @@ static int pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
    >>> return 0;
    >>>
    >>> found_issuer:
    >>> - pr_debug("- issuer %s\n", p->subject);
    >>> + pr_debug("- subject %s\n", p->subject);
    >>> if (p->seen) {
    >>> pr_warn("Sig %u: X.509 chain contains loop\n",
    >>> sinfo->index);
    >>> @@ -304,7 +299,8 @@ int pkcs7_verify(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7)
    >>> ret = x509_get_sig_params(x509);
    >>> if (ret < 0)
    >>> return ret;
    >>> - pr_debug("X.509[%u] %s\n", n, x509->authority);
    >>> + pr_debug("X.509[%u] %*phN\n",
    >>> + n, x509->authority->len, x509->authority->data);
    >>> }
    >>>
    >>> for (sinfo = pkcs7->signed_infos; sinfo; sinfo = sinfo->next) {
    >>> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
    >>> index ac72348c186a..96151b2b91a2 100644
    >>> --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
    >>> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
    >>> @@ -46,7 +46,8 @@ void x509_free_certificate(struct x509_certificate *cert)
    >>> public_key_destroy(cert->pub);
    >>> kfree(cert->issuer);
    >>> kfree(cert->subject);
    >>> - kfree(cert->fingerprint);
    >>> + kfree(cert->id);
    >>> + kfree(cert->skid);
    >>> kfree(cert->authority);
    >>> kfree(cert->sig.digest);
    >>> mpi_free(cert->sig.rsa.s);
    >>> @@ -62,6 +63,7 @@ struct x509_certificate *x509_cert_parse(const void *data, size_t datalen)
    >>> {
    >>> struct x509_certificate *cert;
    >>> struct x509_parse_context *ctx;
    >>> + struct asymmetric_key_id *kid;
    >>> long ret;
    >>>
    >>> ret = -ENOMEM;
    >>> @@ -89,6 +91,17 @@ struct x509_certificate *x509_cert_parse(const void *data, size_t datalen)
    >>> if (ret < 0)
    >>> goto error_decode;
    >>>
    >>> + /* Generate cert issuer + serial number key ID */
    >>> + kid = asymmetric_key_generate_id(cert->raw_serial,
    >>> + cert->raw_serial_size,
    >>> + cert->raw_issuer,
    >>> + cert->raw_issuer_size);
    >>> + if (IS_ERR(kid)) {
    >>> + ret = PTR_ERR(kid);
    >>> + goto error_decode;
    >>> + }
    >>> + cert->id = kid;
    >>> +
    >>> kfree(ctx);
    >>> return cert;
    >>>
    >>> @@ -407,36 +420,34 @@ int x509_process_extension(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
    >>> const void *value, size_t vlen)
    >>> {
    >>> struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
    >>> + struct asymmetric_key_id *kid;
    >>> const unsigned char *v = value;
    >>> - char *f;
    >>> int i;
    >>>
    >>> pr_debug("Extension: %u\n", ctx->last_oid);
    >>>
    >>> if (ctx->last_oid == OID_subjectKeyIdentifier) {
    >>> /* Get hold of the key fingerprint */
    >>> - if (vlen < 3)
    >>> + if (ctx->cert->skid || vlen < 3)
    >>> return -EBADMSG;
    >>> if (v[0] != ASN1_OTS || v[1] != vlen - 2)
    >>> return -EBADMSG;
    >>> v += 2;
    >>> vlen -= 2;
    >>>
    >>> - f = kmalloc(vlen * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
    >>> - if (!f)
    >>> - return -ENOMEM;
    >>> - for (i = 0; i < vlen; i++)
    >>> - sprintf(f + i * 2, "%02x", v[i]);
    >>> - pr_debug("fingerprint %s\n", f);
    >>> - ctx->cert->fingerprint = f;
    >>> + kid = asymmetric_key_generate_id(v, vlen,
    >>> + ctx->cert->raw_subject,
    >>> + ctx->cert->raw_subject_size);
    >>> + if (IS_ERR(kid))
    >>> + return PTR_ERR(kid);
    >>> + ctx->cert->skid = kid;
    >>> + pr_debug("subjkeyid %*phN\n", kid->len, kid->data);
    >>> return 0;
    >>> }
    >>>
    >>> if (ctx->last_oid == OID_authorityKeyIdentifier) {
    >>> - size_t key_len;
    >>> -
    >>> /* Get hold of the CA key fingerprint */
    >>> - if (vlen < 5)
    >>> + if (ctx->cert->authority || vlen < 5)
    >>> return -EBADMSG;
    >>>
    >>> /* Authority Key Identifier must be a Constructed SEQUENCE */
    >>> @@ -454,7 +465,7 @@ int x509_process_extension(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
    >>> v[3] > vlen - 4)
    >>> return -EBADMSG;
    >>>
    >>> - key_len = v[3];
    >>> + vlen = v[3];
    >>> v += 4;
    >>> } else {
    >>> /* Long Form length */
    >>> @@ -476,17 +487,17 @@ int x509_process_extension(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
    >>> v[sub + 1] > vlen - 4 - sub)
    >>> return -EBADMSG;
    >>>
    >>> - key_len = v[sub + 1];
    >>> + vlen = v[sub + 1];
    >>> v += (sub + 2);
    >>> }
    >>>
    >>> - f = kmalloc(key_len * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
    >>> - if (!f)
    >>> - return -ENOMEM;
    >>> - for (i = 0; i < key_len; i++)
    >>> - sprintf(f + i * 2, "%02x", v[i]);
    >>> - pr_debug("authority %s\n", f);
    >>> - ctx->cert->authority = f;
    >>> + kid = asymmetric_key_generate_id(v, vlen,
    >>> + ctx->cert->raw_issuer,
    >>> + ctx->cert->raw_issuer_size);
    >>> + if (IS_ERR(kid))
    >>> + return PTR_ERR(kid);
    >>> + pr_debug("authkeyid %*phN\n", kid->len, kid->data);
    >>> + ctx->cert->authority = kid;
    >>> return 0;
    >>> }
    >>>
    >>> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
    >>> index 1b76f207c1f3..0e8d59b010fb 100644
    >>> --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
    >>> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
    >>> @@ -19,8 +19,9 @@ struct x509_certificate {
    >>> struct public_key_signature sig; /* Signature parameters */
    >>> char *issuer; /* Name of certificate issuer */
    >>> char *subject; /* Name of certificate subject */
    >>> - char *fingerprint; /* Key fingerprint as hex */
    >>> - char *authority; /* Authority key fingerprint as hex */
    >>> + struct asymmetric_key_id *id; /* Issuer + serial number */
    >>> + struct asymmetric_key_id *skid; /* Subject key identifier */
    >>> + struct asymmetric_key_id *authority; /* Authority key identifier */
    >>> struct tm valid_from;
    >>> struct tm valid_to;
    >>> const void *tbs; /* Signed data */
    >>> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
    >>> index f3d62307e6ee..c60905c3f4d2 100644
    >>> --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
    >>> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
    >>> @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@
    >>> #include "x509_parser.h"
    >>>
    >>> static bool use_builtin_keys;
    >>> -static char *ca_keyid;
    >>> +static struct asymmetric_key_id *ca_keyid;
    >>>
    >>> #ifndef MODULE
    >>> static int __init ca_keys_setup(char *str)
    >>> @@ -33,10 +33,16 @@ static int __init ca_keys_setup(char *str)
    >>> if (!str) /* default system keyring */
    >>> return 1;
    >>>
    >>> - if (strncmp(str, "id:", 3) == 0)
    >>> - ca_keyid = str; /* owner key 'id:xxxxxx' */
    >>> - else if (strcmp(str, "builtin") == 0)
    >>> + if (strncmp(str, "id:", 3) == 0) {
    >>> + struct asymmetric_key_id *p;
    >>> + p = asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id(str);
    >>> + if (p == ERR_PTR(-EINVAL))
    >>> + pr_err("Unparsable hex string in ca_keys\n");
    >>> + else if (!IS_ERR(p))
    >>> + ca_keyid = p; /* owner key 'id:xxxxxx' */
    >>> + } else if (strcmp(str, "builtin") == 0) {
    >>> use_builtin_keys = true;
    >>> + }
    >>>
    >>> return 1;
    >>> }
    >>> @@ -46,31 +52,28 @@ __setup("ca_keys=", ca_keys_setup);
    >>> /**
    >>> * x509_request_asymmetric_key - Request a key by X.509 certificate params.
    >>> * @keyring: The keys to search.
    >>> - * @subject: The name of the subject to whom the key belongs.
    >>> - * @key_id: The subject key ID as a hex string.
    >>> + * @kid: The key ID.
    >>> *
    >>> * Find a key in the given keyring by subject name and key ID. These might,
    >>> * for instance, be the issuer name and the authority key ID of an X.509
    >>> * certificate that needs to be verified.
    >>> */
    >>> struct key *x509_request_asymmetric_key(struct key *keyring,
    >>> - const char *subject,
    >>> - const char *key_id)
    >>> + const struct asymmetric_key_id *kid)
    >>> {
    >>> key_ref_t key;
    >>> - size_t subject_len = strlen(subject), key_id_len = strlen(key_id);
    >>> - char *id;
    >>> + char *id, *p;
    >>>
    >>> - /* Construct an identifier "<subjname>:<keyid>". */
    >>> - id = kmalloc(subject_len + 2 + key_id_len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
    >>> + /* Construct an identifier "id:<keyid>". */
    >>> + p = id = kmalloc(2 + 1 + kid->len * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
    >>> if (!id)
    >>> return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
    >>>
    >>> - memcpy(id, subject, subject_len);
    >>> - id[subject_len + 0] = ':';
    >>> - id[subject_len + 1] = ' ';
    >>> - memcpy(id + subject_len + 2, key_id, key_id_len);
    >>> - id[subject_len + 2 + key_id_len] = 0;
    >>> + *p++ = 'i';
    >>> + *p++ = 'd';
    >>> + *p++ = ':';
    >>> + p = bin2hex(p, kid->data, kid->len);
    >>> + *p = 0;
    >>>
    >>> pr_debug("Look up: \"%s\"\n", id);
    >>>
    >>> @@ -195,11 +198,10 @@ static int x509_validate_trust(struct x509_certificate *cert,
    >>> if (!trust_keyring)
    >>> return -EOPNOTSUPP;
    >>>
    >>> - if (ca_keyid && !asymmetric_keyid_match(cert->authority, ca_keyid))
    >>> + if (ca_keyid && !asymmetric_key_id_same(cert->authority, ca_keyid))
    >>> return -EPERM;
    >>>
    >>> - key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring,
    >>> - cert->issuer, cert->authority);
    >>> + key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring, cert->authority);
    >>> if (!IS_ERR(key)) {
    >>> if (!use_builtin_keys
    >>> || test_bit(KEY_FLAG_BUILTIN, &key->flags))
    >>> @@ -214,9 +216,11 @@ static int x509_validate_trust(struct x509_certificate *cert,
    >>> */
    >>> static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
    >>> {
    >>> + struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids;
    >>> struct x509_certificate *cert;
    >>> + const char *q;
    >>> size_t srlen, sulen;
    >>> - char *desc = NULL;
    >>> + char *desc = NULL, *p;
    >>> int ret;
    >>>
    >>> cert = x509_cert_parse(prep->data, prep->datalen);
    >>> @@ -249,19 +253,12 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
    >>> pkey_algo_name[cert->sig.pkey_algo],
    >>> hash_algo_name[cert->sig.pkey_hash_algo]);
    >>>
    >>> - if (!cert->fingerprint) {
    >>> - pr_warn("Cert for '%s' must have a SubjKeyId extension\n",
    >>> - cert->subject);
    >>> - ret = -EKEYREJECTED;
    >>> - goto error_free_cert;
    >>> - }
    >>> -
    >>> cert->pub->algo = pkey_algo[cert->pub->pkey_algo];
    >>> cert->pub->id_type = PKEY_ID_X509;
    >>>
    >>> /* Check the signature on the key if it appears to be self-signed */
    >>> if (!cert->authority ||
    >>> - strcmp(cert->fingerprint, cert->authority) == 0) {
    >>> + asymmetric_key_id_same(cert->skid, cert->authority)) {
    >>> ret = x509_check_signature(cert->pub, cert); /* self-signed */
    >>> if (ret < 0)
    >>> goto error_free_cert;
    >>> @@ -273,31 +270,47 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
    >>>
    >>> /* Propose a description */
    >>> sulen = strlen(cert->subject);
    >>> - srlen = strlen(cert->fingerprint);
    >>> + srlen = cert->raw_serial_size;
    >>> + q = cert->raw_serial;
    >>> + if (srlen > 1 && *q == 0) {
    >>> + srlen--;
    >>> + q++;
    >>> + }
    >>> +
    >>> ret = -ENOMEM;
    >>> - desc = kmalloc(sulen + 2 + srlen + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
    >>> + desc = kmalloc(sulen + 2 + srlen * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
    >>> if (!desc)
    >>> goto error_free_cert;
    >>> - memcpy(desc, cert->subject, sulen);
    >>> - desc[sulen] = ':';
    >>> - desc[sulen + 1] = ' ';
    >>> - memcpy(desc + sulen + 2, cert->fingerprint, srlen);
    >>> - desc[sulen + 2 + srlen] = 0;
    >>> + p = memcpy(desc, cert->subject, sulen);
    >>> + p += sulen;
    >>> + *p++ = ':';
    >>> + *p++ = ' ';
    >>> + p = bin2hex(p, q, srlen);
    >>> + *p = 0;
    >>> +
    >>> + kids = kmalloc(sizeof(struct asymmetric_key_ids), GFP_KERNEL);
    >>> + if (!kids)
    >>> + goto error_free_desc;
    >>> + kids->id[0] = cert->id;
    >>> + kids->id[1] = cert->skid;
    >>>
    >>> /* We're pinning the module by being linked against it */
    >>> __module_get(public_key_subtype.owner);
    >>> prep->type_data[0] = &public_key_subtype;
    >>> - prep->type_data[1] = cert->fingerprint;
    >>> + prep->type_data[1] = kids;
    >>> prep->payload[0] = cert->pub;
    >>> prep->description = desc;
    >>> prep->quotalen = 100;
    >>>
    >>> /* We've finished with the certificate */
    >>> cert->pub = NULL;
    >>> - cert->fingerprint = NULL;
    >>> + cert->id = NULL;
    >>> + cert->skid = NULL;
    >>> desc = NULL;
    >>> ret = 0;
    >>>
    >>> +error_free_desc:
    >>> + kfree(desc);
    >>> error_free_cert:
    >>> x509_free_certificate(cert);
    >>> return ret;
    >>> diff --git a/include/crypto/public_key.h b/include/crypto/public_key.h
    >>> index 0d164c6af539..fa73a6fd536c 100644
    >>> --- a/include/crypto/public_key.h
    >>> +++ b/include/crypto/public_key.h
    >>> @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
    >>> #define _LINUX_PUBLIC_KEY_H
    >>>
    >>> #include <linux/mpi.h>
    >>> +#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
    >>> #include <crypto/hash_info.h>
    >>>
    >>> enum pkey_algo {
    >>> @@ -98,8 +99,8 @@ struct key;
    >>> extern int verify_signature(const struct key *key,
    >>> const struct public_key_signature *sig);
    >>>
    >>> +struct asymmetric_key_id;
    >>> extern struct key *x509_request_asymmetric_key(struct key *keyring,
    >>> - const char *issuer,
    >>> - const char *key_id);
    >>> + const struct asymmetric_key_id *kid);
    >>>
    >>> #endif /* _LINUX_PUBLIC_KEY_H */
    >>>
    >>> --
    >>> To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in
    >>> the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org
    >>> More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
    >>>
    >> --
    >> To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in
    >> the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org
    >> More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
    >>
    >
    > --
    > To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in
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    --
    Thanks,
    Dmitry


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