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SubjectRe: [GIT PULL] x86/kaslr for v3.14
Am 27.01.2014 07:52, schrieb H. Peter Anvin:
> Of course, stack traces themselves contain that information, so one
> could argue that oops=panic is required in order for kASLR to provide
> any kind of security against root. (oops=panic is probably a good idea
> in secure environments anyway...)

Now I understand your point.

/proc/<pid>/stack and a world-readable /boot also need to be disabled.
Deploying a secure kASLR is not easy, especially for end-user distros.

Maybe a CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE_I_MEAN_IT which disables various sources of
information leakage would help too. ;-)

Thanks,
//richard


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