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SubjectRe: [PATCH] LSM: ModPin LSM for module loading restrictions
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[+rusty]

On Mon, Sep 23, 2013 at 6:28 PM, James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> wrote:
> On Tue, 24 Sep 2013, James Morris wrote:
>
>> On Fri, 20 Sep 2013, Kees Cook wrote:
>>
>> > This LSM enforces that modules must all come from the same filesystem,
>> > with the expectation that such a filesystem is backed by a read-only
>> > device such as dm-verity or CDROM. This allows systems that have a
>> > verified or unchanging filesystem to enforce module loading restrictions
>> > without needing to sign the modules individually.
>> >
>> > Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
>>
>> Are you using this for ChromeOS?

Yes. Chrome OS uses a read-only root filesystem that is backed by
dm-verity. This lets us pin all module loading to that filesystem
without needing per-module signatures.

> Also, you should CC Rusty on this.

Done! :)

-Kees

>
>
>>
>>
>> > ---
>> > security/Kconfig | 6 ++
>> > security/Makefile | 2 +
>> > security/modpin/Kconfig | 9 +++
>> > security/modpin/Makefile | 1 +
>> > security/modpin/modpin.c | 197 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>> > 5 files changed, 215 insertions(+)
>> > create mode 100644 security/modpin/Kconfig
>> > create mode 100644 security/modpin/Makefile
>> > create mode 100644 security/modpin/modpin.c
>> >
>> > diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
>> > index e9c6ac7..80172fd 100644
>> > --- a/security/Kconfig
>> > +++ b/security/Kconfig
>> > @@ -121,6 +121,7 @@ source security/selinux/Kconfig
>> > source security/smack/Kconfig
>> > source security/tomoyo/Kconfig
>> > source security/apparmor/Kconfig
>> > +source security/modpin/Kconfig
>> > source security/yama/Kconfig
>> >
>> > source security/integrity/Kconfig
>> > @@ -131,6 +132,7 @@ choice
>> > default DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK if SECURITY_SMACK
>> > default DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO if SECURITY_TOMOYO
>> > default DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR if SECURITY_APPARMOR
>> > + default DEFAULT_SECURITY_MODPIN if SECURITY_MODPIN
>> > default DEFAULT_SECURITY_YAMA if SECURITY_YAMA
>> > default DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
>> >
>> > @@ -150,6 +152,9 @@ choice
>> > config DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR
>> > bool "AppArmor" if SECURITY_APPARMOR=y
>> >
>> > + config DEFAULT_SECURITY_MODPIN
>> > + bool "ModPin" if SECURITY_MODPIN=y
>> > +
>> > config DEFAULT_SECURITY_YAMA
>> > bool "Yama" if SECURITY_YAMA=y
>> >
>> > @@ -164,6 +169,7 @@ config DEFAULT_SECURITY
>> > default "smack" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK
>> > default "tomoyo" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO
>> > default "apparmor" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR
>> > + default "modpin" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_MODPIN
>> > default "yama" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_YAMA
>> > default "" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
>> >
>> > diff --git a/security/Makefile b/security/Makefile
>> > index c26c81e..73d0a05 100644
>> > --- a/security/Makefile
>> > +++ b/security/Makefile
>> > @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) += selinux
>> > subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK) += smack
>> > subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO) += tomoyo
>> > subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor
>> > +subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_MODPIN) += modpin
>> > subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA) += yama
>> >
>> > # always enable default capabilities
>> > @@ -22,6 +23,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK) += smack/built-in.o
>> > obj-$(CONFIG_AUDIT) += lsm_audit.o
>> > obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO) += tomoyo/built-in.o
>> > obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor/built-in.o
>> > +obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_MODPIN) += modpin/built-in.o
>> > obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA) += yama/built-in.o
>> > obj-$(CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE) += device_cgroup.o
>> >
>> > diff --git a/security/modpin/Kconfig b/security/modpin/Kconfig
>> > new file mode 100644
>> > index 0000000..5be9dd5
>> > --- /dev/null
>> > +++ b/security/modpin/Kconfig
>> > @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
>> > +config SECURITY_MODPIN
>> > + bool "Module filesystem origin pinning"
>> > + depends on SECURITY
>> > + help
>> > + Module loading will be pinned to the first filesystem used for
>> > + loading. Any modules that come from other filesystems will be
>> > + rejected. This is best used on systems without an initrd that
>> > + have a root filesystem backed by a read-only device such as
>> > + dm-verity or a CDROM.
>> > diff --git a/security/modpin/Makefile b/security/modpin/Makefile
>> > new file mode 100644
>> > index 0000000..9080b29
>> > --- /dev/null
>> > +++ b/security/modpin/Makefile
>> > @@ -0,0 +1 @@
>> > +obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_MODPIN) += modpin.o
>> > diff --git a/security/modpin/modpin.c b/security/modpin/modpin.c
>> > new file mode 100644
>> > index 0000000..107b4d8
>> > --- /dev/null
>> > +++ b/security/modpin/modpin.c
>> > @@ -0,0 +1,197 @@
>> > +/*
>> > + * Module Pinning Security Module
>> > + *
>> > + * Copyright 2011-2013 Google Inc.
>> > + *
>> > + * Authors:
>> > + * Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
>> > + *
>> > + * This software is licensed under the terms of the GNU General Public
>> > + * License version 2, as published by the Free Software Foundation, and
>> > + * may be copied, distributed, and modified under those terms.
>> > + *
>> > + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
>> > + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
>> > + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
>> > + * GNU General Public License for more details.
>> > + */
>> > +
>> > +#define pr_fmt(fmt) "ModPin LSM: " fmt
>> > +
>> > +#include <linux/module.h>
>> > +#include <linux/security.h>
>> > +#include <linux/sched.h>
>> > +#include <linux/fs.h>
>> > +#include <linux/fs_struct.h>
>> > +#include <linux/mount.h>
>> > +#include <linux/path.h>
>> > +#include <linux/root_dev.h>
>> > +
>> > +static void report_load_module(struct path *path, char *operation)
>> > +{
>> > + char *alloced = NULL;
>> > + char *pathname; /* Pointer to either static string or "alloced". */
>> > +
>> > + if (!path)
>> > + pathname = "<unknown>";
>> > + else {
>> > + /* We will allow 11 spaces for ' (deleted)' to be appended */
>> > + alloced = pathname = kmalloc(PATH_MAX+11, GFP_KERNEL);
>> > + if (!pathname)
>> > + pathname = "<no_memory>";
>> > + else {
>> > + pathname = d_path(path, pathname, PATH_MAX+11);
>> > + if (IS_ERR(pathname))
>> > + pathname = "<too_long>";
>> > + }
>> > + }
>> > +
>> > + pr_notice("init_module %s module=%s pid=%d\n",
>> > + operation, pathname, task_pid_nr(current));
>> > +
>> > + kfree(alloced);
>> > +}
>> > +
>> > +static int modpin_enforced = 1;
>> > +static struct dentry *pinned_root;
>> > +static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(pinned_root_spinlock);
>> > +
>> > +#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
>> > +static int zero;
>> > +static int one = 1;
>> > +
>> > +static struct ctl_path modpin_sysctl_path[] = {
>> > + { .procname = "kernel", },
>> > + { .procname = "modpin", },
>> > + { }
>> > +};
>> > +
>> > +static struct ctl_table modpin_sysctl_table[] = {
>> > + {
>> > + .procname = "enforced",
>> > + .data = &modpin_enforced,
>> > + .maxlen = sizeof(int),
>> > + .mode = 0644,
>> > + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
>> > + .extra1 = &zero,
>> > + .extra2 = &one,
>> > + },
>> > + { }
>> > +};
>> > +
>> > +/*
>> > + * Check if the root device is read-only (e.g. dm-verity is enabled).
>> > + * This must be called after early kernel init, since only then is the
>> > + * rootdev available.
>> > + */
>> > +static bool rootdev_readonly(void)
>> > +{
>> > + bool rc;
>> > + struct block_device *bdev;
>> > + const fmode_t mode = FMODE_WRITE;
>> > +
>> > + bdev = blkdev_get_by_dev(ROOT_DEV, mode, NULL);
>> > + if (IS_ERR(bdev)) {
>> > + /* In this weird case, assume it is read-only. */
>> > + pr_info("dev(%u,%u): FMODE_WRITE disallowed?!\n",
>> > + MAJOR(ROOT_DEV), MINOR(ROOT_DEV));
>> > + return true;
>> > + }
>> > +
>> > + rc = bdev_read_only(bdev);
>> > + blkdev_put(bdev, mode);
>> > +
>> > + pr_info("dev(%u,%u): %s\n", MAJOR(ROOT_DEV), MINOR(ROOT_DEV),
>> > + rc ? "read-only" : "writable");
>> > +
>> > + return rc;
>> > +}
>> > +
>> > +static void check_pinning_enforcement(void)
>> > +{
>> > + /*
>> > + * If module pinning is not being enforced, allow sysctl to change
>> > + * modes for testing.
>> > + */
>> > + if (!rootdev_readonly()) {
>> > + if (!register_sysctl_paths(modpin_sysctl_path,
>> > + modpin_sysctl_table))
>> > + pr_notice("sysctl registration failed!\n");
>> > + else
>> > + pr_info("module pinning can be disabled.\n");
>> > + } else
>> > + pr_info("module pinning engaged.\n");
>> > +}
>> > +#else
>> > +static void check_pinning_enforcement(void) { }
>> > +#endif
>> > +
>> > +
>> > +static int modpin_load_module(struct file *file)
>> > +{
>> > + struct dentry *module_root;
>> > +
>> > + if (!file) {
>> > + if (!modpin_enforced) {
>> > + report_load_module(NULL, "old-api-pinning-ignored");
>> > + return 0;
>> > + }
>> > +
>> > + report_load_module(NULL, "old-api-denied");
>> > + return -EPERM;
>> > + }
>> > +
>> > + module_root = file->f_path.mnt->mnt_root;
>> > +
>> > + /* First loaded module defines the root for all others. */
>> > + spin_lock(&pinned_root_spinlock);
>> > + if (!pinned_root) {
>> > + pinned_root = dget(module_root);
>> > + /*
>> > + * Unlock now since it's only pinned_root we care about.
>> > + * In the worst case, we will (correctly) report pinning
>> > + * failures before we have announced that pinning is
>> > + * enabled. This would be purely cosmetic.
>> > + */
>> > + spin_unlock(&pinned_root_spinlock);
>> > + check_pinning_enforcement();
>> > + report_load_module(&file->f_path, "pinned");
>> > + return 0;
>> > + }
>> > + spin_unlock(&pinned_root_spinlock);
>> > +
>> > + if (module_root != pinned_root) {
>> > + if (unlikely(!modpin_enforced)) {
>> > + report_load_module(&file->f_path, "pinning-ignored");
>> > + return 0;
>> > + }
>> > +
>> > + report_load_module(&file->f_path, "denied");
>> > + return -EPERM;
>> > + }
>> > +
>> > + return 0;
>> > +}
>> > +
>> > +static struct security_operations modpin_ops = {
>> > + .name = "modpin",
>> > + .kernel_module_from_file = modpin_load_module,
>> > +};
>> > +
>> > +static int __init modpin_init(void)
>> > +{
>> > + int error;
>> > +
>> > + error = register_security(&modpin_ops);
>> > +
>> > + if (error)
>> > + panic("Could not register ModPin security module");
>> > +
>> > + pr_info("ready to pin.\n");
>> > +
>> > + return error;
>> > +}
>> > +security_initcall(modpin_init);
>> > +
>> > +module_param(modpin_enforced, int, S_IRUSR);
>> > +MODULE_PARM_DESC(modpin_enforced, "Module pinning enforced (default: true)");
>> > --
>> > 1.7.9.5
>> >
>> >
>> > --
>> > Kees Cook
>> > Chrome OS Security
>> > --
>> > To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
>> > the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org
>> > More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
>> > Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
>> >
>>
>> --
>> James Morris
>> <jmorris@namei.org>
>> --
>> To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in
>> the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org
>> More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
>>
>
> --
> James Morris
> <jmorris@namei.org>



--
Kees Cook
Chrome OS Security


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