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SubjectRe: [PATCH 1/2] procfs: restore 0400 permissions on /proc/*/{syscall,stack,personality}
Djalal Harouni <> writes:

> (Sorry for my late response)
> On Thu, Aug 29, 2013 at 03:14:32PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
>> On Thu, Aug 29, 2013 at 2:11 AM, Djalal Harouni <> wrote:
>> > Hi Eric,
>> >
>> > On Wed, Aug 28, 2013 at 05:26:56PM -0700, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
>> >>
>> >> I have take a moment and read this thread, and have been completely
>> >> unenlightend. People are upset but it is totally unclear why.
>> >>
>> >> There is no explanation why it is ok to ignore the suid-exec case, as
>> >> the posted patches do. Which ultimately means the patches provide
>> > Please, did you take a look at the patches ?
>> > - INF("syscall", S_IRUGO, proc_pid_syscall),
>> > + INF("syscall", S_IRUSR, proc_pid_syscall),
>> >
>> > Can you please tell me how did you come to the conclusion that the
>> > patches "ignore the suid-exec case as the posted patches do" ?
>> There are a few conditions that need to be handled. The original fix
>> that Al landed was to stop this:
>> create IPC
>> fork child
>> child opens /proc/self/syscall
>> child sends fd to parent over IPC
>> child execs setuid process
>> parent reads setuid process's "syscall" file
>> The solution was to check perms of reader (in this case parent wasn't
>> privileged, so it gets denied).
> Yes, of course
>> The new problem is:
>> open /proc/$target/syscall
>> dup to stdin
>> exec setuid process that reports contents of stdin
>> So, changing perms to 0400 doesn't actually fix what we want to fix,
>> since it can still by bypassed under more limited situations:
>> open /proc/self/syscall
>> dup to stdin
>> exec setuid process that reports contents of stdin
>> So, changing to 0400 means only setuid programs that aren't already
>> running will have their ASLR leaked.
> Yes I do realize. That change was only to block leaks against already
> running processes and *restore* the old permissions.
>> [...]
>> Maybe I'm lacking imagination, but changing to 0400 does reduce the
>> scope of the leak from all processes to "just" what was execed. This
>> still needs to be addressed, but I don't see a way to handle this
>> without explicitly invalidating the /proc handle across exec.
> Yes Kees,
> I did try a year ago to adapt the exec_id from grsecurity and failed
> (and failed again to resend - not enough resources):
> Kees IMHO the right solution is to invalidate the fd across exec as
> you suggest
> Alan Cox's thread which describe the problem correctly:
> Alan suggested to revoke() the file handles.

That was in particular with respect to /dev/mem.

In the general case calling setuid or any of it's cousins can cause the
same problem. So a revoke that only works at exec time is insufficient.

The problem we are examining is what happens when the file descriptor is
passed to a more privileged process that will pass the ptrace_may_access
check while the original process that opened the file did not.

We have file->f_cred that has the permissions of the process at open
time, and likely that should factor into the calculations somehow.

Alternatively we may simply be able to call get_task_cred() at the time
we open the file and if the cred on the process changes fail. I know
Linus was looking at something like that recently, but ran into problmes
with Chromes sandbox. (Sigh). Although I think he was talking about

This is most definitely a solvable problem with current mechanisms, but
it is going to take some grunt work to make it happen.


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