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SubjectRe: [REVIEW][PATCH 2/5] userns: Allow PR_CAPBSET_DROP in a user namespace.
Quoting Eric W. Biederman (ebiederm@xmission.com):
>
> As the capabilites and capability bounding set are per user namespace
> properties it is safe to allow changing them with just CAP_SETPCAP
> permission in the user namespace.
>
> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
> Tested-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>

Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>

> ---
> security/commoncap.c | 2 +-
> 1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
> index c44b6fe..9fccf71 100644
> --- a/security/commoncap.c
> +++ b/security/commoncap.c
> @@ -824,7 +824,7 @@ int cap_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
> */
> static long cap_prctl_drop(struct cred *new, unsigned long cap)
> {
> - if (!capable(CAP_SETPCAP))
> + if (!ns_capable(current_user_ns(), CAP_SETPCAP))
> return -EPERM;
> if (!cap_valid(cap))
> return -EINVAL;
> --
> 1.7.5.4


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