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SubjectRe: CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_FS root exploit
On Thu, Mar 14, 2013 at 1:29 PM, Eric W. Biederman
<ebiederm@xmission.com> wrote:
> Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> writes:
>
>> On 03/13/2013 11:35 AM, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
>>> Kees Cook <keescook-F7+t8E8rja9g9hUCZPvPmw@public.gmane.org> writes:
>>>
>>>> Hi,
>>>>
>>>> It seem like we should block (at least) this combination. On 3.9, this
>>>> exploit works once uidmapping is added.
>>>>
>>>> http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2013/03/13/10
>>>
>>> Yes. That is a bad combination. It let's chroot confuse privileged
>>> processes.
>>>
>>> Now to figure out if this is easier to squash by adding a user_namespace
>>> to fs_struct or by just forbidding this combination.
>>
>> It's worth making sure that setns(2) doesn't have similar issues.
>
> setns(2) and unshare(2) are done and merged. See commit.
>
> commit e66eded8309ebf679d3d3c1f5820d1f2ca332c71
> Author: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
> Date: Wed Mar 13 11:51:49 2013 -0700
>
> userns: Don't allow CLONE_NEWUSER | CLONE_FS
>
>
>> Looking through other shared-but-not-a-namespace things, there are:
>>
>> fs_struct: Buggy as noted.
>>
>> files_struct: Probably harmless -- SCM_RIGHTS can emulate it
>>
>> signal_struct: This interacts with the tty code. Is it okay?
>
> It should be. The tty code is heavily pid based, and CLONE_NEWPID
> requires !CLONE_VM (which implies !CLONE_SIGHAND and !CLONE_VM).
>
>> sighand_struct: Looks safe. Famous last words.
>>
>> FWIW, I've been alarmed in the past that struct path (e.g. the root
>> directory) implies an mnt_namespace (hidden in struct mount), and it's
>> entirely possible for the root directory's mnt_namespace not to match
>> nsproxy->mnt_namespace. I'm not sure what the implications are, but
>> this doesn't seem healthy.
>
> The calls to check_mnt prevent abuse of the files found with fs_struct
> not matching the current mount namespace.
>
> static inline int check_mnt(struct mount *mnt)
> {
> return mnt->mnt_ns == current->nsproxy->mnt_ns;
> }
>
> Thanks for looking I know I did the same double take and wondered if I
> had missed anything else by accident when this bug showed up.
>
> So far even just looking it all over again I can't see anything. But I
> have clearly been blind before.

This is way too fun. Got another one :/

I'll follow up in a sec off-list.

--Andy


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