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SubjectRe: [RFC PATCH v3 2/6] uretprobes/x86: hijack return address
On Fri, Mar 01, 2013 at 12:00:43PM +0100, Anton Arapov wrote:
> On Fri, Mar 01, 2013 at 11:15:36AM +0530, Ananth N Mavinakayanahalli wrote:
> > On Thu, Feb 28, 2013 at 12:00:11PM +0100, Anton Arapov wrote:

...

> > > +extern unsigned long arch_uretprobe_hijack_return_addr(unsigned long
> > > + rp_trampoline_vaddr, struct pt_regs *regs)
> > > +{
> > > + int rasize, ncopied;
> > > + unsigned long orig_ret_vaddr = 0; /* clear high bits for 32-bit apps */
> > > +
> > > + rasize = is_ia32_task() ? 4 : 8;
> > > + ncopied = copy_from_user(&orig_ret_vaddr, (void __user *)regs->sp, rasize);
> > > + if (unlikely(ncopied))
> >
> > What if ncopied < rasize? Agreed that the upper order bits can be 0, but should
> > you not validate ncopied == rasize?
>
> Function returns 0 in case copy_from_user() was not able to copy
> return address entirely, and "if (ncopied)" makes sure of it. We
> can't continue if we have no correct return address.
>
> copy_from_user() returns number of bytes that were *not* copied,
> thus "ncopied == rasize" means copy_from_user() was not able to copy
> *all* bytes. I don't see the point of such check here.
>
> Or am I missing anything?

You are right... my bad.

Ananth



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