Messages in this thread | | | Date | Fri, 1 Mar 2013 00:52:51 +0100 (CET) | From | Jiri Kosina <> | Subject | Re: [GIT PULL] Load keys from signed PE binaries |
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On Thu, 28 Feb 2013, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> > > Sure, if you've been infected before the revocation, you'll still be > > > infected. There's not really any good way around that. > > > > Which is a very substantial difference to normal X509 chain of trust, > > isn't it? > > If you've loaded an x.509 certificate into the kernel and it's later > revoked, any module signed with the key is going to be loadable until > it's revoked. I don't see an especially large difference here?
i_own_your_ring0.ko can be modprobed long after blacklisting of "hello world" binary hash has happened on the very particular machine in its dbx (as there is no link, in a x509-chain-of-trust-sense, between the hash of the PE binary and the i_own_your_ring0.ko signature key).
modprobe of a module signed by a key that has been blacklisted on the very particular machine in its dbx is not going to work (as there is a very direct x509 chain of trust link).
No?
Thanks,
-- Jiri Kosina SUSE Labs
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