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    SubjectRe: [GIT PULL] Load keys from signed PE binaries
    On Mon, 25 Feb 2013, David Howells wrote:

    > (G) Suspend to disk. This is not permitted if it's possible to then alter
    > the image and resume it.

    Tangetial to this discussion, but worth mentioning anyway: this can be
    solved in a secure way in cooperation with trusted bootloader (such as
    shim); bootloader can be (re-)generating a new keypair on each and every
    boot, providing it to kernel. Kernel then signs the hibernation image and
    discards the private key.

    During resume, the image signature (as public key still exists) can be
    verified, and new keypair is generated for potential subsequent
    hibernation again.
    The public key is preserved in trusted UEFI variable, giving it the
    exactly same level of security as for example MOK has.

    This still has some challenges (having enough entropy available for
    keypair generation in bootloader is unlikely, but PRNG might be
    sufficient), but it is doable.

    Jiri Kosina
    SUSE Labs

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