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    SubjectRe: [GIT PULL] Load keys from signed PE binaries
    On Mon, Feb 25, 2013 at 03:28:32PM +0100, Florian Weimer wrote:

    > But what puzzles me most is why anyone would assume that the UEFI
    > application signing process somehow ensures that the embedded
    > certificate is non-malicious. We cannot even track it back to the
    > submitter because the third-pary market place UEFI authority only
    > issues pseudonymous proxy certificates. This utterly useless for any
    > purpose whatsoever, with the notable exception of avoding one
    > additional step when setting up a dual-boot machine (which will not
    > even work reliably until we switch to overwriting the Windows boot
    > loader, like in the pre-UEFI days).

    If your firmware trusts objects signed by Microsoft, you have to assume
    that objects signed by Microsoft are trustworthy. There's no way to
    build a security model otherwise. Are Microsoft trustworthy? We don't
    know. If you don't trust Microsoft, remove their key from db.

    > Seriously, folks, can we go back one step and discuss what problem you
    > are trying to solve? Is it about allowing third-party kernel modules
    > in an environment which does not allow unsigned ring 0 code execution?

    The problem I'm trying to solve is "Don't permit Linux to be used as a
    bootloader for backdoored versions of other operating systems". Any
    other security benefit is a happy side effect.

    --
    Matthew Garrett | mjg59@srcf.ucam.org


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