Messages in this thread | | | Subject | Re: [GIT] Security subsystem updates for 3.9 | From | Mimi Zohar <> | Date | Thu, 21 Feb 2013 13:06:19 -0500 |
| |
On Thu, 2013-02-21 at 08:26 -0800, Linus Torvalds wrote: > On Thu, Feb 21, 2013 at 6:03 AM, James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> wrote: > > This is basically a maintenance update for the TPM driver and EVM/IMA. > > Hmm. There were conflicts in lib/digsig.c and ima_main.c. The digsig > one was pretty trivial, but I'd like people to take a look at the IMA > one. > > And that's not because the conflict itself was all that complex - I'm > pretty sure I resolved it correctly. But I do want to make sure that > everybody agrees on the whole module integrity checking thing. I > resolved it to be like the semantics in Mimi's commit a7f2a366f623, > which means that for non-file modules, IMA does: > > Only fail the non-file module if > (a) IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES was set
Almost, and enforcing file integrity is enabled. The merged result should look like what's contained in linux-integrity/next-upstreamed-patches:
int ima_module_check(struct file *file) { if (!file) { if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES) && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)) { #ifndef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */ #endif } return 0; } return process_measurement(file, file->f_dentry->d_name.name, MAY_EXEC, MODULE_CHECK); }
thanks,
Mimi
> *and* > (b) CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE is not set.
> If CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE it ignores IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES entirely, > and the module signature checking overrides everything. And if > IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES is not set, we say "whatever". So it makes sense, > but I wanted people to just be aware of it and agree on it, since the > security tree modified this part without apparently being aware of the > changed semantics.
| |