| Date | Sun, 17 Feb 2013 22:50:56 +0000 | From | Ben Hutchings <> | Subject | [ 55/66] net: sctp: sctp_endpoint_free: zero out secret key data |
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3.2-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
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From: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
[ Upstream commit b5c37fe6e24eec194bb29d22fdd55d73bcc709bf ]
On sctp_endpoint_destroy, previously used sensitive keying material should be zeroed out before the memory is returned, as we already do with e.g. auth keys when released.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevic@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> --- net/sctp/endpointola.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
diff --git a/net/sctp/endpointola.c b/net/sctp/endpointola.c index c8cc24e..dbe5870a 100644 --- a/net/sctp/endpointola.c +++ b/net/sctp/endpointola.c @@ -248,6 +248,8 @@ void sctp_endpoint_free(struct sctp_endpoint *ep) /* Final destructor for endpoint. */ static void sctp_endpoint_destroy(struct sctp_endpoint *ep) { + int i; + SCTP_ASSERT(ep->base.dead, "Endpoint is not dead", return); /* Free up the HMAC transform. */ @@ -270,6 +272,9 @@ static void sctp_endpoint_destroy(struct sctp_endpoint *ep) sctp_inq_free(&ep->base.inqueue); sctp_bind_addr_free(&ep->base.bind_addr); + for (i = 0; i < SCTP_HOW_MANY_SECRETS; ++i) + memset(&ep->secret_key[i], 0, SCTP_SECRET_SIZE); + /* Remove and free the port */ if (sctp_sk(ep->base.sk)->bind_hash) sctp_put_port(ep->base.sk);
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