Messages in this thread | | | Date | Fri, 13 Dec 2013 10:37:14 -0800 | Subject | Re: [PATCH 1/9] Known exploit detection | From | Kees Cook <> |
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On Fri, Dec 13, 2013 at 10:14 AM, Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> wrote: > On Fri, Dec 13, 2013 at 9:58 AM, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote: >> >> These locations tend to be very hard to reach accidentally > > Not necessarily. > > Don't get me wrong - I think that it's a good idea to at least have > the option to complain about certain errors, and leave markers in the > logs about things that look suspicious. > > But looking through the recent list of commits that explicitly mention > a CVE, the only one I find where a syslog message would make sense is > the HID validation ones. There, adding a warning about malicious HID > devices sounds like a good idea. > > But a *lot* of the rest is just checking ranges or making sure we have > proper string handling etc that just wouldn't be practical to check. > So the error itself may be "hard to reach accidentally", but > *checking* it would be so complex/painful that it would likely just > introduce more room for bugs. > > So I think the "WARNING" thing is a good idea, but I think it is a > good idea if it's used very judiciously. IOW, not for "random CVE" > (because quite frankly, most of them seem to be utter shit), but for > serious known issues. And for those issues *only*. > > If I start seeing patches adding warnings "just because there's a > CVE", then I'm not in the least interested. But if there is some known > root-kit or similar, then by all means..
Yeah, totally agreed. Doing it for all CVEs (or even most) would be a disaster. Stuff like memory content leak CVEs are usually on common paths that userspace uses all the time. Vegard proposed only doing it for serious privilege escalation issues, and I couldn't agree more.
-Kees
-- Kees Cook Chrome OS Security
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