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SubjectRe: [PATCH v6 0/7] Kernel base address randomization
I think that the randomization offset would be necessary in order to identify pointers.

Ingo Molnar <> wrote:
>* Kees Cook <> wrote:
>> Here is the latest version of the kASLR series. It has much improved
>> e820 walking code, and expands the window available on 64-bit.
>> This is rolled out on Chrome OS devices, and working well.
>There's one kernel debuggability detail that should be discussed I
>should symbolic printouts (in oops messages but also in /proc/kallsyms)
>and instrumentation interfaces that expose kernel addresses attempt to
>de-randomize the addresses, stack contents and register values that lie
>within the random range?
>- it would be easier to use those addresses and look them up in a
> or in a as well.
> - it would be somewhat safer to post an oops publicly if it did not
> contain the random offset in an easily identifiable way.
>- oops patterns from distribution kernels that enable randomization
> match up better.
> - this would make it safer to expose /proc/kallsyms to user-space
> profiling, while keeping the random offset a kernel-internal secret.
> - RIP information in profiling streams would thus not contain the
> kernel random offset either.
>The other approach would be what your series does, to keep all the raw,
>randomized output and to assume that users who are allowed to access to
>logs or profiling can learn the random offset.
>I tend to lean towards the 'raw' approach that you picked, but an
>can be made for both approaches - and in any case I haven't seen this
>discussed to conclusion with cons/pros listed and a consensus/decision
> Ingo

Sent from my mobile phone. Please pardon brevity and lack of formatting.

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