Messages in this thread | | | Date | Tue, 01 Oct 2013 22:30:58 -0700 | From | "H. Peter Anvin" <> | Subject | Re: [PATCH v6 0/7] Kernel base address randomization |
| |
On 10/01/2013 10:25 PM, Ingo Molnar wrote: > > I mean, for example in an oops message we print data in words: the RIP, > other registers and stack contents. If any of these values lies within the > randomization range then we could de-randomize it. > > So instead of exposing randomized values, we could expose de-randomized > values. > > ( This isn't fool-proof: if some data value happens to lie within the > random range spuriously then we'll incorrectly transform it. In the > context of oops messages this should not be a big practical problem > though. ) >
I don't agree that this isn't a big practical problem. I often find it necessary to pick out "things that look like pointers". Overall, derandomization would make it possible to get really confused when you have things like half a pointer overwritten.
-hpa
| |