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SubjectRe: [PATCH] LSM: ModPin LSM for module loading restrictions
On Thu, Oct 17, 2013 at 4:30 AM, Jarkko Sakkinen
<> wrote:
> On Thu, Oct 17, 2013 at 07:02:17PM +1100, James Morris wrote:
>> This seems like a regression in terms of separating mechanism and policy.
>> We have several access control systems available (SELinux, at least) which
>> can implement this functionality with existing mechanisms using dynamic
>> policy.
>> I'm concerned about the long term architectural impact of a proliferation
>> of arbitrary hard-coded security policies in the kernel. I don't
>> understand the push in this direction, frankly.
> The biggest risk in LSM stacker is really to become backdoor for very product
> dilated kernel changes that are not accepted to the mainline kernel. I think
> having LSM stacker would be benefical but barrier should be set very high
> for "one-shot" modules.
> One big benefit that I see in LSM stacker is not at least directly security
> related. It would be perfect integration tool when you want for example
> provide Android run-time in an OS that uses AppArmor or SMACK as its security
> framework.

I think of stacking as a way to help people do quick prototyping of
security changes without getting in the way of their distro's MAC.


Kees Cook
Chrome OS Security

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