Messages in this thread | | | Date | Mon, 28 Jan 2013 18:05:56 -0800 | From | "H. Peter Anvin" <> | Subject | Re: [PATCH 0/2] Secure Boot: More controversial changes |
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On 01/28/2013 08:47 AM, Matthew Garrett wrote: > These patches break functionality that people rely on without providing > any functional equivalent, so I'm not suggesting that they be merged > as-is. kexec allows trivial circumvention of the trust model (it's > trivially equivalent to permitting module loading, for instance) and > hibernation allows similar attacks (disable swap, write a pre-formed resume > image to swap, reboot). The hibernation patch also shows up a different > issue - some userspace drops all capabilities, resulting in things that > userspace expects to work no longer working. This seems like an > unsurprising result, but breaking userspace is bad and so it'd be nice to > figure out if there's another way to handle this.
These at the very least need some kind of CONFIG_WEAK_SECURE_BOOT option or something like that.
-hpa
-- H. Peter Anvin, Intel Open Source Technology Center I work for Intel. I don't speak on their behalf.
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