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    Subject[PATCH 07/11] kexec: Disable in a secure boot environment
    Date
    kexec could be used as a vector for a malicious user to use a signed kernel
    to circumvent the secure boot trust model. In the long run we'll want to
    support signed kexec payloads, but for the moment we should just disable
    loading entirely in that situation.

    Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
    ---
    kernel/kexec.c | 2 +-
    1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

    diff --git a/kernel/kexec.c b/kernel/kexec.c
    index 0668d58..48852ec 100644
    --- a/kernel/kexec.c
    +++ b/kernel/kexec.c
    @@ -944,7 +944,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(kexec_load, unsigned long, entry, unsigned long, nr_segments,
    int result;

    /* We only trust the superuser with rebooting the system. */
    - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_BOOT))
    + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_BOOT) || !capable(CAP_SECURE_FIRMWARE))
    return -EPERM;

    /*
    --
    1.7.11.4


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