Messages in this thread Patch in this message | | | From | Matthew Garrett <> | Subject | [PATCH 07/11] kexec: Disable in a secure boot environment | Date | Tue, 4 Sep 2012 11:55:13 -0400 |
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kexec could be used as a vector for a malicious user to use a signed kernel to circumvent the secure boot trust model. In the long run we'll want to support signed kexec payloads, but for the moment we should just disable loading entirely in that situation.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com> --- kernel/kexec.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/kernel/kexec.c b/kernel/kexec.c index 0668d58..48852ec 100644 --- a/kernel/kexec.c +++ b/kernel/kexec.c @@ -944,7 +944,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(kexec_load, unsigned long, entry, unsigned long, nr_segments, int result; /* We only trust the superuser with rebooting the system. */ - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_BOOT)) + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_BOOT) || !capable(CAP_SECURE_FIRMWARE)) return -EPERM; /* -- 1.7.11.4
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