Messages in this thread | | | Date | Fri, 6 Apr 2012 12:49:21 -0700 | From | Andrew Morton <> | Subject | Re: [PATCH v17 01/15] Add PR_{GET,SET}_NO_NEW_PRIVS to prevent execve from granting privs |
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On Thu, 29 Mar 2012 15:01:46 -0500 Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org> wrote:
> From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> > > With this set, a lot of dangerous operations (chroot, unshare, etc) > become a lot less dangerous because there is no possibility of > subverting privileged binaries. > > This patch completely breaks apparmor. Someone who understands (and > uses) apparmor should fix it or at least give me a hint.
So [patch 2/15] fixes all this up?
I guess we should join the two patches into one, to avoid a silly breakage window. That means that John loses a brownie point, but we can mention him in the changelog, include his signed-off-by:
> Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Several of these patches are missing your signed-off-by:. They should all have your SOB, because you sent them. Documentation/SubmittingPatches explains this.
I'm trying to find a way to merge all this code without reviewing it ;) Alas, this is against my rules. Given the length of time for which this patchset has been floating around, I'm a little surprised by the lack of acked-by's and reviewed-by's. Have you been gathering them all up? Are the networking guys all happy about this patchset?
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