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SubjectRe: [patch] Add design document for UBIFS secure deletion
On 03/19/2012 09:54 AM, Joel Reardon wrote:

Nice job overall. I have just a few comments below.

> Design document should be self explanatory.
> Signed-off-by: Joel Reardon <>
> ---
> Documentation/filesystems/ubifsec.txt | 358 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 1 files changed, 358 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
> create mode 100644 Documentation/filesystems/ubifsec.txt
> diff --git a/Documentation/filesystems/ubifsec.txt b/Documentation/filesystems/ubifsec.txt
> new file mode 100644
> index 0000000..4eb41fb
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/Documentation/filesystems/ubifsec.txt
> @@ -0,0 +1,357 @@
> +UBIFS Secure Deletion Enhancement
> +
> +Written by Joel Reardon <>
> +Last revised: 19.3.2012
> +
> +Introduction
> +============


> +Key State Map
> +=============


> +The operation of purging performed on a correct key state map guarantees
> +DNEFS's soundness: purging securely deletes any key in the KSA marked as

What is DNEFS?

> +deleted---afterwards, every key either decrypts one valid data node or nothing
> +at all and every valid data node can be decrypted. A correct key state map
> +also guarantees the integrity of our data during purging, because no key that
> +is used to decrypt valid data will be removed.
> +


> +
> +The key state map is built from a periodic checkpoint combined with a replay
> +of the most recent changes while mounting. We checkpoint the current key
> +state map to the storage medium whenever the KSA is purged. After a purge,
> +every key is either unused or used, and so a checkpoint of this map can be
> +stored using one bit per key---less than 1\% of the KSA's size---which is then

drop '\' ?

> +compressed. A special LEB is used to store checkpoints, where each new

What is LEB?

> +checkpoint is appended; when the erase block is full then the next checkpoint
> +is written at the beginning using an atomic update.
> +
> +Correctness of the Key State Map
> +================================


> +Second, failure can occur after purging one, several, or indeed all of the
> +KSA's LEBs. When remounting the device, the loaded checkpoint merged with the
> +replay data reflects the state before the first purge, so some purged LEBs
> +contain new unused data while the key state map claims it is a deleted key. As
> +these are cryptographically-suitable random values, with high probability they
> +cannot successfully decrypt any existing valid data node.

Last sentence seems to be incomplete or just odd.

> +
> +Third, failure can occur while writing to the checkpoint LEB. When the
> +checkpoint is written using atomic updates, then failing during the operation
> +is equivalent to failing before it begins (cf. 2nd case). Incomplete

No need to save the space and lots of people probably won't know what
cf. is.

> +checkpoints are detected and so the previous valid checkpoint is loaded
> +instead. After replaying all the nodes, the key state map is equal to its
> +state immediately before purging the KSA. This means that all entries marked
> +as deleted are actually unused entries, so the invariant holds.


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