lkml.org 
[lkml]   [2012]   [Feb]   [21]   [last100]   RSS Feed
Views: [wrap][no wrap]   [headers]  [forward] 
 
Messages in this thread
Patch in this message
/
From
Subject[PATCH v10 11/11] Documentation: prctl/seccomp_filter
Date
Documents how system call filtering using Berkeley Packet
Filter programs works and how it may be used.
Includes an example for x86 (32-bit) and a semi-generic
example using a macro-based code generator.

v10: - update for SIGSYS
- update for new seccomp_data layout
- update for ptrace option use
v9: - updated bpf-direct.c for SIGILL
v8: - add PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS to the samples.
v7: - updated for all the new stuff in v7: TRAP, TRACE
- only talk about PR_SET_SECCOMP now
- fixed bad JLE32 check (coreyb@linux.vnet.ibm.com)
- adds dropper.c: a simple system call disabler
v6: - tweak the language to note the requirement of
PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS being called prior to use. (luto@mit.edu)
v5: - update sample to use system call arguments
- adds a "fancy" example using a macro-based generator
- cleaned up bpf in the sample
- update docs to mention arguments
- fix prctl value (eparis@redhat.com)
- language cleanup (rdunlap@xenotime.net)
v4: - update for no_new_privs use
- minor tweaks
v3: - call out BPF <-> Berkeley Packet Filter (rdunlap@xenotime.net)
- document use of tentative always-unprivileged
- guard sample compilation for i386 and x86_64
v2: - move code to samples (corbet@lwn.net)

Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
---
Documentation/prctl/seccomp_filter.txt | 157 +++++++++++++++++++++
samples/Makefile | 2 +-
samples/seccomp/Makefile | 31 ++++
samples/seccomp/bpf-direct.c | 150 ++++++++++++++++++++
samples/seccomp/bpf-fancy.c | 102 ++++++++++++++
samples/seccomp/bpf-helper.c | 89 ++++++++++++
samples/seccomp/bpf-helper.h | 236 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
samples/seccomp/dropper.c | 68 +++++++++
8 files changed, 834 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 Documentation/prctl/seccomp_filter.txt
create mode 100644 samples/seccomp/Makefile
create mode 100644 samples/seccomp/bpf-direct.c
create mode 100644 samples/seccomp/bpf-fancy.c
create mode 100644 samples/seccomp/bpf-helper.c
create mode 100644 samples/seccomp/bpf-helper.h
create mode 100644 samples/seccomp/dropper.c

diff --git a/Documentation/prctl/seccomp_filter.txt b/Documentation/prctl/seccomp_filter.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7de865b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/prctl/seccomp_filter.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,157 @@
+ SECure COMPuting with filters
+ =============================
+
+Introduction
+------------
+
+A large number of system calls are exposed to every userland process
+with many of them going unused for the entire lifetime of the process.
+As system calls change and mature, bugs are found and eradicated. A
+certain subset of userland applications benefit by having a reduced set
+of available system calls. The resulting set reduces the total kernel
+surface exposed to the application. System call filtering is meant for
+use with those applications.
+
+Seccomp filtering provides a means for a process to specify a filter for
+incoming system calls. The filter is expressed as a Berkeley Packet
+Filter (BPF) program, as with socket filters, except that the data
+operated on is related to the system call being made: system call
+number and the system call arguments. This allows for expressive
+filtering of system calls using a filter program language with a long
+history of being exposed to userland and a straightforward data set.
+
+Additionally, BPF makes it impossible for users of seccomp to fall prey
+to time-of-check-time-of-use (TOCTOU) attacks that are common in system
+call interposition frameworks. BPF programs may not dereference
+pointers which constrains all filters to solely evaluating the system
+call arguments directly.
+
+What it isn't
+-------------
+
+System call filtering isn't a sandbox. It provides a clearly defined
+mechanism for minimizing the exposed kernel surface. It is meant to be
+a tool for sandbox developers to use. Beyond that, policy for logical
+behavior and information flow should be managed with a combination of
+other system hardening techniques and, potentially, an LSM of your
+choosing. Expressive, dynamic filters provide further options down this
+path (avoiding pathological sizes or selecting which of the multiplexed
+system calls in socketcall() is allowed, for instance) which could be
+construed, incorrectly, as a more complete sandboxing solution.
+
+Usage
+-----
+
+An additional seccomp mode is added and is enabled using the same
+prctl(2) call as the strict seccomp. If the architecture has
+CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER, then filters may be added as below:
+
+PR_SET_SECCOMP:
+ Now takes an additional argument which specifies a new filter
+ using a BPF program.
+ The BPF program will be executed over struct seccomp_data
+ reflecting the system call number, arguments, and other
+ metadata. The BPF program must then return one of the
+ acceptable values to inform the kernel which action should be
+ taken.
+
+ Usage:
+ prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, prog);
+
+ The 'prog' argument is a pointer to a struct sock_fprog which
+ will contain the filter program. If the program is invalid, the
+ call will return -1 and set errno to EINVAL.
+
+ Note, is_compat_task is also tracked for the @prog. This means
+ that once set the calling task will have all of its system calls
+ blocked if it switches its system call ABI.
+
+ If fork/clone and execve are allowed by @prog, any child
+ processes will be constrained to the same filters and system
+ call ABI as the parent.
+
+ Prior to use, the task must call prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1) or
+ run with CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileges in its namespace. If these are not
+ true, -EACCES will be returned. This requirement ensures that filter
+ programs cannot be applied to child processes with greater privileges
+ than the task that installed them.
+
+ Additionally, if prctl(2) is allowed by the attached filter,
+ additional filters may be layered on which will increase evaluation
+ time, but allow for further decreasing the attack surface during
+ execution of a process.
+
+The above call returns 0 on success and non-zero on error.
+
+Return values
+-------------
+
+A seccomp filter may return any of the following values:
+ SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW, SECCOMP_RET_KILL, SECCOMP_RET_TRAP,
+ SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO, or SECCOMP_RET_TRACE.
+
+SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW:
+ If all filters for a given task return this value then
+ the system call will proceed normally.
+
+SECCOMP_RET_KILL:
+ If any filters for a given take return this value then
+ the task will exit immediately without executing the system
+ call.
+
+SECCOMP_RET_TRAP:
+ If any filters specify SECCOMP_RET_TRAP and none of them
+ specify SECCOMP_RET_KILL, then the kernel will send a SIGTRAP
+ signal to the task and not execute the system call. The kernel
+ will rollback the register state to just before system call
+ entry such that a signal handler in the process will be able
+ to inspect the ucontext_t->uc_mcontext registers and emulate
+ system call success or failure upon return from the signal
+ handler.
+
+ The SIGTRAP is differentiated by other SIGTRAPS by a si_code
+ of TRAP_SECCOMP.
+
+SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO:
+ If returned, the value provided in the lower 16-bits is
+ returned to userland as the errno and the system call is
+ not executed.
+
+SECCOMP_RET_TRACE:
+ If any filters return this value and the others return
+ SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW, then the kernel will attempt to notify
+ a ptrace()-based tracer prior to executing the system call.
+
+ A tracer will be notified if it requests PTRACE_O_TRACESECCOMP
+ via PTRACE_SETOPTIONS. Otherwise, the system call will
+ not execute and -ENOSYS will be returned to userspace.
+
+ If the tracer ignores notification, then the system call will
+ proceed normally. Changes to the registers will function
+ similarly to PTRACE_SYSCALL. Additionally, if the tracer
+ detaches during notification or just after, the task may be
+ terminated as precautionary measure.
+
+Please note that the order of precedence is as follows:
+SECCOMP_RET_KILL, SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO, SECCOMP_RET_TRAP,
+SECCOMP_RET_TRACE, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW.
+
+If multiple filters exist, the return value for the evaluation of a given
+system call will always use the highest precedent value.
+SECCOMP_RET_KILL will always take precedence.
+
+
+Example
+-------
+
+The samples/seccomp/ directory contains both a 32-bit specific example
+and a more generic example of a higher level macro interface for BPF
+program generation.
+
+Adding architecture support
+-----------------------
+
+See arch/Kconfig for the required functionality. In general, if an
+architecture supports both tracehook and seccomp, it will be able to
+support seccomp filter with minor alteration. Then it must just add
+CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER to its arch-specific Kconfig.
diff --git a/samples/Makefile b/samples/Makefile
index 6280817..f29b19c 100644
--- a/samples/Makefile
+++ b/samples/Makefile
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
# Makefile for Linux samples code

obj-$(CONFIG_SAMPLES) += kobject/ kprobes/ tracepoints/ trace_events/ \
- hw_breakpoint/ kfifo/ kdb/ hidraw/
+ hw_breakpoint/ kfifo/ kdb/ hidraw/ seccomp/
diff --git a/samples/seccomp/Makefile b/samples/seccomp/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..38922f7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/samples/seccomp/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+# kbuild trick to avoid linker error. Can be omitted if a module is built.
+obj- := dummy.o
+
+hostprogs-$(CONFIG_SECCOMP) := bpf-fancy dropper
+bpf-fancy-objs := bpf-fancy.o bpf-helper.o
+
+HOSTCFLAGS_bpf-fancy.o += -I$(objtree)/usr/include
+HOSTCFLAGS_bpf-fancy.o += -idirafter $(objtree)/include
+HOSTCFLAGS_bpf-helper.o += -I$(objtree)/usr/include
+HOSTCFLAGS_bpf-helper.o += -idirafter $(objtree)/include
+
+HOSTCFLAGS_dropper.o += -I$(objtree)/usr/include
+HOSTCFLAGS_dropper.o += -idirafter $(objtree)/include
+dropper-objs := dropper.o
+
+# bpf-direct.c is x86-only.
+ifeq ($(filter-out x86_64 i386,$(KBUILD_BUILDHOST)),)
+# List of programs to build
+hostprogs-$(CONFIG_SECCOMP) += bpf-direct
+bpf-direct-objs := bpf-direct.o
+endif
+
+# Tell kbuild to always build the programs
+always := $(hostprogs-y)
+
+HOSTCFLAGS_bpf-direct.o += -I$(objtree)/usr/include
+HOSTCFLAGS_bpf-direct.o += -idirafter $(objtree)/include
+ifeq ($(KBUILD_BUILDHOST),x86_64)
+HOSTCFLAGS_bpf-direct.o += -m32
+HOSTLOADLIBES_bpf-direct += -m32
+endif
diff --git a/samples/seccomp/bpf-direct.c b/samples/seccomp/bpf-direct.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..56e5443
--- /dev/null
+++ b/samples/seccomp/bpf-direct.c
@@ -0,0 +1,150 @@
+/*
+ * 32-bit seccomp filter example with BPF macros
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium OS Authors <chromium-os-dev@chromium.org>
+ * Author: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
+ *
+ * The code may be used by anyone for any purpose,
+ * and can serve as a starting point for developing
+ * applications using prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, 2, ...).
+ */
+#define __USE_GNU 1
+#define _GNU_SOURCE 1
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/filter.h>
+#include <linux/seccomp.h>
+#include <linux/unistd.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/prctl.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#define syscall_arg(_n) (offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[_n]))
+#define syscall_nr (offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr))
+
+#ifndef PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS
+#define PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS 36
+#endif
+
+#ifndef SYS_SECCOMP
+#define SYS_SECCOMP 1
+#endif
+
+static void emulator(int nr, siginfo_t *info, void *void_context)
+{
+ ucontext_t *ctx = (ucontext_t *)(void_context);
+ int syscall;
+ char *buf;
+ ssize_t bytes;
+ size_t len;
+ if (info->si_code != SYS_SECCOMP)
+ return;
+ if (!ctx)
+ return;
+ syscall = ctx->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_EAX];
+ buf = (char *) ctx->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_ECX];
+ len = (size_t) ctx->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_EDX];
+
+ if (syscall != __NR_write)
+ return;
+ if (ctx->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_EBX] != STDERR_FILENO)
+ return;
+ /* Redirect stderr messages to stdout. Doesn't handle EINTR, etc */
+ write(STDOUT_FILENO, "[ERR] ", 6);
+ bytes = write(STDOUT_FILENO, buf, len);
+ ctx->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_EAX] = bytes;
+ return;
+}
+
+static int install_emulator(void)
+{
+ struct sigaction act;
+ sigset_t mask;
+ memset(&act, 0, sizeof(act));
+ sigemptyset(&mask);
+ sigaddset(&mask, SIGSYS);
+
+ act.sa_sigaction = &emulator;
+ act.sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO;
+ if (sigaction(SIGSYS, &act, NULL) < 0) {
+ perror("sigaction");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (sigprocmask(SIG_UNBLOCK, &mask, NULL)) {
+ perror("sigprocmask");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int install_filter(void)
+{
+ struct sock_filter filter[] = {
+ /* Grab the system call number */
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, syscall_nr),
+ /* Jump table for the allowed syscalls */
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, __NR_rt_sigreturn, 0, 1),
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, __NR_sigreturn, 0, 1),
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, __NR_exit_group, 0, 1),
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, __NR_exit, 0, 1),
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, __NR_read, 1, 0),
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, __NR_write, 3, 2),
+
+ /* Check that read is only using stdin. */
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, syscall_arg(0)),
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, STDIN_FILENO, 4, 0),
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_KILL),
+
+ /* Check that write is only using stdout */
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, syscall_arg(0)),
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, STDOUT_FILENO, 1, 0),
+ /* Trap attempts to write to stderr */
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, STDERR_FILENO, 1, 2),
+
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_TRAP),
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_KILL),
+ };
+ struct sock_fprog prog = {
+ .len = (unsigned short)(sizeof(filter)/sizeof(filter[0])),
+ .filter = filter,
+ };
+
+ if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0)) {
+ perror("prctl(NO_NEW_PRIVS)");
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+
+ if (prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog)) {
+ perror("prctl");
+ return 1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#define payload(_c) (_c), sizeof((_c))
+int main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+ char buf[4096];
+ ssize_t bytes = 0;
+ if (install_emulator())
+ return 1;
+ if (install_filter())
+ return 1;
+ syscall(__NR_write, STDOUT_FILENO,
+ payload("OHAI! WHAT IS YOUR NAME? "));
+ bytes = syscall(__NR_read, STDIN_FILENO, buf, sizeof(buf));
+ syscall(__NR_write, STDOUT_FILENO, payload("HELLO, "));
+ syscall(__NR_write, STDOUT_FILENO, buf, bytes);
+ syscall(__NR_write, STDERR_FILENO,
+ payload("Error message going to STDERR\n"));
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/samples/seccomp/bpf-fancy.c b/samples/seccomp/bpf-fancy.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bf1f6b5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/samples/seccomp/bpf-fancy.c
@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
+/*
+ * Seccomp BPF example using a macro-based generator.
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium OS Authors <chromium-os-dev@chromium.org>
+ * Author: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
+ *
+ * The code may be used by anyone for any purpose,
+ * and can serve as a starting point for developing
+ * applications using prctl(PR_ATTACH_SECCOMP_FILTER).
+ */
+
+#include <linux/filter.h>
+#include <linux/seccomp.h>
+#include <linux/unistd.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/prctl.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "bpf-helper.h"
+
+#ifndef PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS
+#define PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS 36
+#endif
+
+int main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+ struct bpf_labels l;
+ static const char msg1[] = "Please type something: ";
+ static const char msg2[] = "You typed: ";
+ char buf[256];
+ struct sock_filter filter[] = {
+ /* TODO: LOAD_SYSCALL_NR(arch) and enforce an arch */
+ LOAD_SYSCALL_NR,
+ SYSCALL(__NR_exit, ALLOW),
+ SYSCALL(__NR_exit_group, ALLOW),
+ SYSCALL(__NR_write, JUMP(&l, write_fd)),
+ SYSCALL(__NR_read, JUMP(&l, read)),
+ DENY, /* Don't passthrough into a label */
+
+ LABEL(&l, read),
+ ARG(0),
+ JNE(STDIN_FILENO, DENY),
+ ARG(1),
+ JNE((unsigned long)buf, DENY),
+ ARG(2),
+ JGE(sizeof(buf), DENY),
+ ALLOW,
+
+ LABEL(&l, write_fd),
+ ARG(0),
+ JEQ(STDOUT_FILENO, JUMP(&l, write_buf)),
+ JEQ(STDERR_FILENO, JUMP(&l, write_buf)),
+ DENY,
+
+ LABEL(&l, write_buf),
+ ARG(1),
+ JEQ((unsigned long)msg1, JUMP(&l, msg1_len)),
+ JEQ((unsigned long)msg2, JUMP(&l, msg2_len)),
+ JEQ((unsigned long)buf, JUMP(&l, buf_len)),
+ DENY,
+
+ LABEL(&l, msg1_len),
+ ARG(2),
+ JLT(sizeof(msg1), ALLOW),
+ DENY,
+
+ LABEL(&l, msg2_len),
+ ARG(2),
+ JLT(sizeof(msg2), ALLOW),
+ DENY,
+
+ LABEL(&l, buf_len),
+ ARG(2),
+ JLT(sizeof(buf), ALLOW),
+ DENY,
+ };
+ struct sock_fprog prog = {
+ .filter = filter,
+ .len = (unsigned short)(sizeof(filter)/sizeof(filter[0])),
+ };
+ ssize_t bytes;
+ bpf_resolve_jumps(&l, filter, sizeof(filter)/sizeof(*filter));
+
+ if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0)) {
+ perror("prctl(NO_NEW_PRIVS)");
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog)) {
+ perror("prctl(SECCOMP)");
+ return 1;
+ }
+ syscall(__NR_write, STDOUT_FILENO, msg1, strlen(msg1));
+ bytes = syscall(__NR_read, STDIN_FILENO, buf, sizeof(buf)-1);
+ bytes = (bytes > 0 ? bytes : 0);
+ syscall(__NR_write, STDERR_FILENO, msg2, strlen(msg2));
+ syscall(__NR_write, STDERR_FILENO, buf, bytes);
+ /* Now get killed */
+ syscall(__NR_write, STDERR_FILENO, msg2, strlen(msg2)+2);
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/samples/seccomp/bpf-helper.c b/samples/seccomp/bpf-helper.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..579cfe3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/samples/seccomp/bpf-helper.c
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+/*
+ * Seccomp BPF helper functions
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium OS Authors <chromium-os-dev@chromium.org>
+ * Author: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
+ *
+ * The code may be used by anyone for any purpose,
+ * and can serve as a starting point for developing
+ * applications using prctl(PR_ATTACH_SECCOMP_FILTER).
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "bpf-helper.h"
+
+int bpf_resolve_jumps(struct bpf_labels *labels,
+ struct sock_filter *filter, size_t count)
+{
+ struct sock_filter *begin = filter;
+ __u8 insn = count - 1;
+
+ if (count < 1)
+ return -1;
+ /*
+ * Walk it once, backwards, to build the label table and do fixups.
+ * Since backward jumps are disallowed by BPF, this is easy.
+ */
+ filter += insn;
+ for (; filter >= begin; --insn, --filter) {
+ if (filter->code != (BPF_JMP+BPF_JA))
+ continue;
+ switch ((filter->jt<<8)|filter->jf) {
+ case (JUMP_JT<<8)|JUMP_JF:
+ if (labels->labels[filter->k].location == 0xffffffff) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Unresolved label: '%s'\n",
+ labels->labels[filter->k].label);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ filter->k = labels->labels[filter->k].location -
+ (insn + 1);
+ filter->jt = 0;
+ filter->jf = 0;
+ continue;
+ case (LABEL_JT<<8)|LABEL_JF:
+ if (labels->labels[filter->k].location != 0xffffffff) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Duplicate label use: '%s'\n",
+ labels->labels[filter->k].label);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ labels->labels[filter->k].location = insn;
+ filter->k = 0; /* fall through */
+ filter->jt = 0;
+ filter->jf = 0;
+ continue;
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Simple lookup table for labels. */
+__u32 seccomp_bpf_label(struct bpf_labels *labels, const char *label)
+{
+ struct __bpf_label *begin = labels->labels, *end;
+ int id;
+ if (labels->count == 0) {
+ begin->label = label;
+ begin->location = 0xffffffff;
+ labels->count++;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ end = begin + labels->count;
+ for (id = 0; begin < end; ++begin, ++id) {
+ if (!strcmp(label, begin->label))
+ return id;
+ }
+ begin->label = label;
+ begin->location = 0xffffffff;
+ labels->count++;
+ return id;
+}
+
+void seccomp_bpf_print(struct sock_filter *filter, size_t count)
+{
+ struct sock_filter *end = filter + count;
+ for ( ; filter < end; ++filter)
+ printf("{ code=%u,jt=%u,jf=%u,k=%u },\n",
+ filter->code, filter->jt, filter->jf, filter->k);
+}
diff --git a/samples/seccomp/bpf-helper.h b/samples/seccomp/bpf-helper.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..273fcd7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/samples/seccomp/bpf-helper.h
@@ -0,0 +1,236 @@
+/*
+ * Example wrapper around BPF macros.
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium OS Authors <chromium-os-dev@chromium.org>
+ * Author: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
+ *
+ * The code may be used by anyone for any purpose,
+ * and can serve as a starting point for developing
+ * applications using prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, 2, ...).
+ *
+ * No guarantees are provided with respect to the correctness
+ * or functionality of this code.
+ */
+#ifndef __BPF_HELPER_H__
+#define __BPF_HELPER_H__
+
+#include <asm/bitsperlong.h> /* for __BITS_PER_LONG */
+#include <linux/filter.h>
+#include <linux/seccomp.h> /* for seccomp_data */
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/unistd.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+
+#define BPF_LABELS_MAX 256
+struct bpf_labels {
+ int count;
+ struct __bpf_label {
+ const char *label;
+ __u32 location;
+ } labels[BPF_LABELS_MAX];
+};
+
+int bpf_resolve_jumps(struct bpf_labels *labels,
+ struct sock_filter *filter, size_t count);
+__u32 seccomp_bpf_label(struct bpf_labels *labels, const char *label);
+void seccomp_bpf_print(struct sock_filter *filter, size_t count);
+
+#define JUMP_JT 0xff
+#define JUMP_JF 0xff
+#define LABEL_JT 0xfe
+#define LABEL_JF 0xfe
+
+#define ALLOW \
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW)
+#define DENY \
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_KILL)
+#define JUMP(labels, label) \
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JA, FIND_LABEL((labels), (label)), \
+ JUMP_JT, JUMP_JF)
+#define LABEL(labels, label) \
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JA, FIND_LABEL((labels), (label)), \
+ LABEL_JT, LABEL_JF)
+#define SYSCALL(nr, jt) \
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, (nr), 0, 1), \
+ jt
+
+/* Lame, but just an example */
+#define FIND_LABEL(labels, label) seccomp_bpf_label((labels), #label)
+
+#define EXPAND(...) __VA_ARGS__
+/* Map all width-sensitive operations */
+#if __BITS_PER_LONG == 32
+
+#define JEQ(x, jt) JEQ32(x, EXPAND(jt))
+#define JNE(x, jt) JNE32(x, EXPAND(jt))
+#define JGT(x, jt) JGT32(x, EXPAND(jt))
+#define JLT(x, jt) JLT32(x, EXPAND(jt))
+#define JGE(x, jt) JGE32(x, EXPAND(jt))
+#define JLE(x, jt) JLE32(x, EXPAND(jt))
+#define JA(x, jt) JA32(x, EXPAND(jt))
+#define ARG(i) ARG_32(i)
+
+#elif __BITS_PER_LONG == 64
+
+/* Ensure that we load the logically correct offset. */
+#if defined(__LITTLE_ENDIAN)
+#define LO_ARG(idx) offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[(idx)])
+#define HI_ARG(idx) offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[(idx)]) + sizeof(__u32)
+#define ENDIAN(_lo, _hi) _lo, _hi
+#elif defined(__BIG_ENDIAN)
+#define ENDIAN(_lo, _hi) _hi, _lo
+#define LO_ARG(idx) offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[(idx)]) + sizeof(__u32)
+#define HI_ARG(idx) offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[(idx)])
+#else
+#error "Unknown endianness"
+#endif
+
+union arg64 {
+ struct {
+ __u32 ENDIAN(lo32, hi32);
+ };
+ __u64 u64;
+};
+
+#define JEQ(x, jt) \
+ JEQ64(((union arg64){.u64 = (x)}).lo32, \
+ ((union arg64){.u64 = (x)}).hi32, \
+ EXPAND(jt))
+#define JGT(x, jt) \
+ JGT64(((union arg64){.u64 = (x)}).lo32, \
+ ((union arg64){.u64 = (x)}).hi32, \
+ EXPAND(jt))
+#define JGE(x, jt) \
+ JGE64(((union arg64){.u64 = (x)}).lo32, \
+ ((union arg64){.u64 = (x)}).hi32, \
+ EXPAND(jt))
+#define JNE(x, jt) \
+ JNE64(((union arg64){.u64 = (x)}).lo32, \
+ ((union arg64){.u64 = (x)}).hi32, \
+ EXPAND(jt))
+#define JLT(x, jt) \
+ JLT64(((union arg64){.u64 = (x)}).lo32, \
+ ((union arg64){.u64 = (x)}).hi32, \
+ EXPAND(jt))
+#define JLE(x, jt) \
+ JLE64(((union arg64){.u64 = (x)}).lo32, \
+ ((union arg64){.u64 = (x)}).hi32, \
+ EXPAND(jt))
+
+#define JA(x, jt) \
+ JA64(((union arg64){.u64 = (x)}).lo32, \
+ ((union arg64){.u64 = (x)}).hi32, \
+ EXPAND(jt))
+#define ARG(i) ARG_64(i)
+
+#else
+#error __BITS_PER_LONG value unusable.
+#endif
+
+/* Loads the arg into A */
+#define ARG_32(idx) \
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, LO_ARG(idx))
+
+/* Loads hi into A and lo in X */
+#define ARG_64(idx) \
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, LO_ARG(idx)), \
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_ST, 0), /* lo -> M[0] */ \
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, HI_ARG(idx)), \
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_ST, 1) /* hi -> M[1] */
+
+#define JEQ32(value, jt) \
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, (value), 0, 1), \
+ jt
+
+#define JNE32(value, jt) \
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, (value), 1, 0), \
+ jt
+
+/* Checks the lo, then swaps to check the hi. A=lo,X=hi */
+#define JEQ64(lo, hi, jt) \
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, (hi), 0, 5), \
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_MEM, 0), /* swap in lo */ \
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, (lo), 0, 2), \
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_MEM, 1), /* passed: swap hi back in */ \
+ jt, \
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_MEM, 1) /* failed: swap hi back in */
+
+#define JNE64(lo, hi, jt) \
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, (hi), 5, 0), \
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_MEM, 0), /* swap in lo */ \
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, (lo), 2, 0), \
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_MEM, 1), /* passed: swap hi back in */ \
+ jt, \
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_MEM, 1) /* failed: swap hi back in */
+
+#define JA32(value, jt) \
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JSET+BPF_K, (value), 0, 1), \
+ jt
+
+#define JA64(lo, hi, jt) \
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JSET+BPF_K, (hi), 3, 0), \
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_MEM, 0), /* swap in lo */ \
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JSET+BPF_K, (lo), 0, 2), \
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_MEM, 1), /* passed: swap hi back in */ \
+ jt, \
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_MEM, 1) /* failed: swap hi back in */
+
+#define JGE32(value, jt) \
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JGE+BPF_K, (value), 0, 1), \
+ jt
+
+#define JLT32(value, jt) \
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JGE+BPF_K, (value), 1, 0), \
+ jt
+
+/* Shortcut checking if hi > arg.hi. */
+#define JGE64(lo, hi, jt) \
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JGT+BPF_K, (hi), 4, 0), \
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, (hi), 0, 5), \
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_MEM, 0), /* swap in lo */ \
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JGE+BPF_K, (lo), 0, 2), \
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_MEM, 1), /* passed: swap hi back in */ \
+ jt, \
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_MEM, 1) /* failed: swap hi back in */
+
+#define JLT64(lo, hi, jt) \
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JGE+BPF_K, (hi), 0, 4), \
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, (hi), 0, 5), \
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_MEM, 0), /* swap in lo */ \
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JGT+BPF_K, (lo), 2, 0), \
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_MEM, 1), /* passed: swap hi back in */ \
+ jt, \
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_MEM, 1) /* failed: swap hi back in */
+
+#define JGT32(value, jt) \
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JGT+BPF_K, (value), 0, 1), \
+ jt
+
+#define JLE32(value, jt) \
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JGT+BPF_K, (value), 1, 0), \
+ jt
+
+/* Check hi > args.hi first, then do the GE checking */
+#define JGT64(lo, hi, jt) \
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JGT+BPF_K, (hi), 4, 0), \
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, (hi), 0, 5), \
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_MEM, 0), /* swap in lo */ \
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JGT+BPF_K, (lo), 0, 2), \
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_MEM, 1), /* passed: swap hi back in */ \
+ jt, \
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_MEM, 1) /* failed: swap hi back in */
+
+#define JLE64(lo, hi, jt) \
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JGT+BPF_K, (hi), 6, 0), \
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, (hi), 0, 3), \
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_MEM, 0), /* swap in lo */ \
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JGT+BPF_K, (lo), 2, 0), \
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_MEM, 1), /* passed: swap hi back in */ \
+ jt, \
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_MEM, 1) /* failed: swap hi back in */
+
+#define LOAD_SYSCALL_NR \
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, \
+ offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr))
+
+#endif /* __BPF_HELPER_H__ */
diff --git a/samples/seccomp/dropper.c b/samples/seccomp/dropper.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..74e035d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/samples/seccomp/dropper.c
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+/*
+ * Naive system call dropper built on seccomp_filter.
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium OS Authors <chromium-os-dev@chromium.org>
+ * Author: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
+ *
+ * The code may be used by anyone for any purpose,
+ * and can serve as a starting point for developing
+ * applications using prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, 2, ...).
+ *
+ * When run, returns the specified errno for the specified
+ * system call number against the given architecture.
+ *
+ * Run this one as root as PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS is not called.
+ */
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/filter.h>
+#include <linux/seccomp.h>
+#include <linux/unistd.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <sys/prctl.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+static int install_filter(int nr, int arch, int error)
+{
+ struct sock_filter filter[] = {
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS,
+ (offsetof(struct seccomp_data, arch))),
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, arch, 0, 3),
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS,
+ (offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr))),
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, nr, 0, 1),
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K,
+ SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO|(error & SECCOMP_RET_DATA)),
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
+ };
+ struct sock_fprog prog = {
+ .len = (unsigned short)(sizeof(filter)/sizeof(filter[0])),
+ .filter = filter,
+ };
+ if (prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, 2, &prog)) {
+ perror("prctl");
+ return 1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+ if (argc < 5) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Usage:\n"
+ "dropper <syscall_nr> <arch> <errno> <prog> [<args>]\n"
+ "Hint: AUDIT_ARCH_I386: %x\n"
+ " AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64: %x\n"
+ "\n", AUDIT_ARCH_I386, AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ if (install_filter(strtol(argv[1], NULL, 0), strtol(argv[2], NULL, 0),
+ strtol(argv[3], NULL, 0)))
+ return 1;
+ execv(argv[4], &argv[4]);
+ printf("Failed to execv\n");
+ return 255;
+}
--
1.7.5.4


\
 
 \ /
  Last update: 2012-02-21 18:35    [W:0.211 / U:1.788 seconds]
©2003-2020 Jasper Spaans|hosted at Digital Ocean and TransIP|Read the blog|Advertise on this site