Messages in this thread | | | Date | Thu, 8 Nov 2012 11:19:28 +0000 | From | Alan Cox <> | Subject | Re: [RFC] Second attempt at kernel secure boot support |
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> You have a fair chance of protecting via physical means (Locked rooms, > Background checks on users etc.) of preventing a user with malicious intent > to access the local machine.
So called "secure boot" doesn't deal with any kind of physical access, which also means its useless if a device is lost and returned and you don't know if it was in the hands of a third party.
> The first thing a computer does when switched on is run its first code > instructions. Commonly referred to as the BIOS.
A good deal more complicated than that. However the signing in hardware and early boot up on a lot of devices already goes as far as the BIOS if the system has BIOS or EFI if it doesn't. You also have all the devices to deal with.
> Normally digital signatures would examine the binary, ensure the signature > matches, and then run the code contained in it.
No - it's a good deal more complicated than that too.
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