Messages in this thread | | | Date | Thu, 1 Nov 2012 13:18:49 +0000 | From | Alan Cox <> | Subject | Re: [RFC] Second attempt at kernel secure boot support |
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> I think it make sense because the private key is still protected by > signer. Any hacker who modified firmware is still need use private key > to generate signature, but hacker's private key is impossible to match > with the public key that kernel used to verify firmware. > > And, I afraid we have no choice that we need put the firmware signature > in a separate file. Contacting with those company's legal department > will be very time-consuming, and I am not sure all company will agree we > put the signature with firmware then distribute.
Then you'd better stop storing it on disk because your disk drive is FEC encoding it and adding a CRC 8)
It does want checking with a lawyer but my understanding is that if you have a file which is a package that contains the firmware and a signature then there is not generally a problem, any more than putting it in an RPM file - it's packaging/aggregation. This should be referred to the Linux Foundation folks perhaps - no point designing something badly to work around a non existant issue.
Also the interface needs to consider that a lot of device firmware is already signed. Nobody notices because they don't ever try and do their own thus many drivers don't need extra signatures in fact.
Alan
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